

# The Great Victorious War Tells



위대한 전쟁이  
정의를 드러낸다



# **The Great Victorious War Tells**

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**Kim Il Sung, an ever-victorious and iron-willed commander**



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## Foreword

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The Fatherland Liberation War (June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953) was a formidable challenge to the Korean people, who had been liberated from the Japanese military rule only five years before, and to the Korean People's Army (KPA), which had been founded only two years before.

The United States hurled into the Korean front huge armed forces, over 2 million strong, including one-third of its ground force, one-fifth of its air force, the greater part of its Pacific Fleet and some of its Mediterranean Fleet, troops of 15 of its satellite countries, south Korean puppet army and Japanese reactionaries. And it mobilized vast quantities of up-to-date combat equipment.

However, the Korean people and the Korean People's Army (KPA), led by Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung, creditably defended the freedom and independence of their country against the enemy incomparably strong in terms of number and military technology.

What is the secret to this, then?

Francisco da Costa Gomes, former Portuguese president, Field Marshal and chief of the staff of the Portuguese forces in the days of the Korean war, once said: The operations plans of the United States were brought to completion through several rounds of discussion by scores of generals including chiefs of staff and military experts of the Western countries which took the side of the United States. But General Kim Il Sung foiled them virtually single-handedly. While witnessing this with my own eyes, I came to realize that he was an inborn military strategist and a great commander the world had ever seen.

American book, *War and the United States*, reads in part: A group of five-star generals, who used to command wide fronts in Europe, Asia, Pacific and Atlantic during the Second World War, fought at the same time in the war in the narrow area of the Korean peninsula. It was unprecedented in the American history. Besides, the United States assigned Walker, Mathew Ridgway, Van Fleet, Mark Clark and Maxwell Taylor and other distinguished B-class generals as field commander of the Korean front in turn.

To see from the historical point of view, the United States was accustomed to winning victory in war by dispatching one or two illustrious generals to the front. However, the Korean front was



## Just in Three Days

a grave of the US generals. During the war, one president, two commanders of the UN forces and one front commander were ousted or dismissed, one front commander was killed in action and one president, one commander of the UN forces and one front commander were recorded in history as defeated generals. Considering the fact that Kim Il Sung, supreme commander of the north Korean army, was a young general in his thirties, this was a very regretful and shameful tragedy for the great America.

As these show, the miraculous victory the Korean people achieved is ascribable entirely to the outstanding leadership of Kim Il Sung.

As Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), Premier of the Cabinet of the DPRK, Chairman of the DPRK Military Commission and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, he led the Party, state, army and people to brilliant victory, braving enormous trials and difficulties.

This book focuses on introducing the original military ideas, strategies and tactics and outstanding art of command Kim Il Sung created during the war.

At 04:00 on June 25, 1950, the US imperialists and their south Korean puppets started a war against the DPRK.

Since it had occupied south Korea militarily in September 1945 as a "liberator," the United States had made detailed preparations for a war, aimed at invading the northern half of Korea. It had set up its puppet regime, and organized a puppet army. After arming the south Korean forces with its military hardware, it had held full command of the forces. And in order to find an excuse for igniting a war on the Korean peninsula, fathom the combat capability of the Korean People's Army and train its puppet troops in real combat actions, it had escalated armed provocations against the north; the armed provocations the south Korean troops and other armed bandits had committed from January 1, 1947 to June 24, 1950, the day before the start of the war, numbered more than 5 150.

With regard to this, Japanese commentator Udai Fujishima wrote in July 1957:

The moves for the war in Korea by US imperialism did not start unexpectedly on June 25, 1950, which people often say the outbreak of the Korean war; it started in 1947, immediately after



the Second World War was over.

The Korean war was an inevitable outcome of the aggressive foreign policy of the United States for world supremacy.

As soon as he received a report on the outbreak of the war, Kim Il Sung convened a meeting of senior officers and operational commanding officers of the then Ministry of National Defence.

As for the counteroffensive strategy, he said at the meeting: We must quickly send KPA units to the front to form counteroffensive forces and deal a powerful strike to the enemy, thus displaying the true mettle of Koreans; our strategic policy for the present stage should be to move to an immediate counteroffensive, annihilate the enemy through quick movements and successive strikes, advance to Pusan, Masan, Mokpho, Ryosu and to the line of the South Sea and liberate the whole of the country before the US imperialists throw their huge forces to the Korean front, and deploy the People's Army units in the whole of Korea in a mobile way so as to prevent the reinforcements of the US imperialists from landing.

This strategy was a scientific one in that it was based on an accurate calculation of the balance of forces between the enemy and the DPRK and on keen observation of the enemy's moves and their fatal points.

It would take the United States at least a month to ship in forces

from the US proper and a certain length of time to dispatch four divisions of its 8<sup>th</sup> Army stationed in Japan. But they had not calculated this when they planned the Korean war.

Moreover, they were not aware of the vulnerability, extreme arrogance and lack of political and moral ethics, unique to the imperialist army soldiers, mercenaries.

In the initial period of the war, the KPA, taking advantage of these weak points of the enemy and bringing its political and ideological, strategic and tactical superiority over the enemy into full play, could build a strong striking capability by concentrating its forces on the front and break the main forces of the enemy, thus moving to the counteroffensive before the United States brought in reinforcements.

At the meeting Kim Il Sung elucidated specific issues related with the realization of the counteroffensive strategy.

He said that an effective way for the success of the strategy was successive offensives.

It was essential to throw the enemy on the defensive by dint of high mobility and successive strikes and allow them no time for building new defence lines and rearranging forces, he continued, adding that it was also important to make preparations for the following operation in a farsighted way while waging an

operation, to successively break the enemy's resistance by forming multiple echelons, to tenaciously pursue the retreating enemy, and to ensure the mobility of troops and equipment in conformity with the mountainous topographical features of Korea.

As for the importance of besieging and annihilating the enemy, he emphasized:

Otherwise, the enemy survivors could offer resistance by using mountains and rivers; then, it would be impossible to implement the strategy of liberating south Korea in the shortest possible period of time through successive strikes; therefore, in conducting all operations and battles primary attention should be paid to encircling and annihilating the enemy, not merely focusing on occupying towns and regions.

To do this, it is necessary to skilfully apply outflanking, which is a basic way for throwing the enemy into confusion and weakening their resistance capability by striking them from the flanks and rear after cutting off the route of their retreat.

And to make the strategy a success, it is important to properly arrange and command cooperation among arms and services and direct close attention to the supply of logistics and recruits.

Pursuant to the strategic policy, the KPA switched over to an immediate and decisive counteroffensive all along the front, putting

the enemy's attacking formation into disarray along the line 1-2km north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

The enemy, who had bragged that they would finish the war in three days, started to beat a retreat.

The KPA combined units were composed of two echelons—the first formed with six infantry divisions and two guard brigades, and the second with three infantry divisions, 9<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade and 83<sup>rd</sup> Motorcycle Regiment.

It was a bolt out of the blue to the enemy that the KPA, having stopped their surprise attack, moved to a decisive counteroffensive all along the front in only 90 minutes.



The KPA soldiers immediately switch over to a counteroffensive.



Moreover, the KPA's large combined units launched a bold offensive with Seoul as the major thrust area. Seoul was where the enemy's main forces were concentrated.

On June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung defined Seoul as the major thrust direction for the counteroffensive strategy and said to officers of the Ministry of National Defence that the main link in the whole chain of the strategic policy was to annihilate the enemy stationed along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and in the Seoul area at one stroke.

As the officers showed signs of surprise and bewilderment, he said confidently: The enemy's main forces are concentrated along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and in the Uijongbu and Seoul areas north of the Han River and there is a negligible force in the area south of the river; this being the situation, we can rapidly follow up our success into the enemy's strategic depth if we encircle and destroy their main groups there in a short period of time.

The sharp and powerful attack by the KPA units converged on Seoul from three directions.

The enemy were on the verge of total collapse.

The brass hats of the United States were utterly at a loss before the sudden change of situation. Commenting on this, an American publication wrote: The worst tragedy on the first day after the outbreak of the war was the collapse of the south Korean

army, which the head of the American Military Advisory Group in south Korea, Brigadier General William Robert, had affirmed was the most powerful army in Asia; ... now it cannot even defend itself; scared by the sounds of battlefields, the soldiers were seen stampeding away like panic-stricken cattle and horses; some of them robbed civilians of their clothes threatening them with bayonets and changed into them before hurrying to mix themselves among groups of refugees.

The KPA combined units fought their way to Seoul like angry waves and arrived at the gateway to the city on the evening of June 27, where they stopped and waited for the order of attack.

Then, to their surprise, they received an order from Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung to suspend the general attack until the morning of June 28.

The order reflected his careful consideration for preventing a possible loss of the lives and property of the Seoul citizens and national cultural assets in the flames of battles.

At 05:00 on June 28, the KPA units launched a general attack and dashed into the city, crushing the enemy's stubborn resistance.

Finally, the flag of the DPRK was raised on the rooftop of the "Capitol building" of the south Korean puppet regime and the whole of the city was liberated at 11: 30 that day.



The KPA units storm into Seoul.



The KPA tankmen are warmly received by the liberated Seoul citizens.

Kang Kon, Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, reported to Kim Il Sung that Seoul was liberated.

Liberating the enemy's stronghold three days after the switchover to a counteroffensive was a great political and military victory of the DPRK.

Following up this miraculous success, the heroic KPA liberated 90% of the territory of the southern half of Korea and over 92% of its population in a little more than a month. During the three days of counterattack the KPA killed or captured about 60 000 enemy troops, captured more than 43 000 small arms and colours of enemy units, and damaged 1 400 trucks, 142 guns of various calibres, aircraft, vessels and many other combat equipment.

The enemy lamented that more than a half of the south Korean army were killed, wounded or taken captive in three days before the fall of Seoul, and the army headquarters could confirm only 22 000 in the military register containing about 98 000.

The KPA's success came not because it was superior to the enemy in terms of the number of troops and combat equipment.

As the enemy acknowledged, the south Korean army was 100 000 strong, but they lost three-fourths of their troops four days after the outbreak of the war, and their main forces were not



merely defeated, but collapsed.

This was a brilliant victory of Kim Il Sung's original strategy of counteroffensive, bold operations with Seoul as the main thrust direction and Juche-oriented tactics of combining operations by large and small units.

## Victory Worthy of Note in the World History of Naval Warfare

In early July 1950, the world media, which had been following the developments on the Korean front with keen interest, ran articles and comments of military experts on the battle in the sea off Jumunjin (East Sea of Korea).

*The KPA Navy Sank US Navy's Heavy Cruiser with Four Torpedo Boats!*

*The KPA Torpedo Boats Sank US Heavy Cruiser: A Miracle, Not a Battle.*

*The KPA Navy sank heavy cruiser Baltimore and damaged a light cruiser of the US Navy's 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet with four torpedo boats. This can be described as a bull having been stung by a bee and knocked out in a tussle. This is a miracle which has never been witnessed in the world history of naval warfare.*

This news caused a stir in the world.

It was on the evening of June 29, 1950, the day after the liberation of Seoul, that Kim Il Sung received a report that a US flotilla which

had entered the East Sea of Korea was bombarding the KPA units on their southward advance and the peaceful towns and villages.

He ordered his aide-de-camp to tell the commander of the navy in Wonsan to come to the Cabinet by the following day.

When he met the navy commander in his office the following day, he told him that a flotilla of the US Navy's 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet was bombarding from the East Sea, destroying roads, bridges and other important facilities and attempting to block the way of the KPA combined units advancing along the east coast.

He continued that if these units failed to ensure the speed of their attack, it would greatly hinder the combat actions of the main units advancing in the inland areas, and gave an order to destroy the flotilla.

The commander was surprised. Actually, on learning that the enemy flotilla had moved to the east coast and was engaged in combat actions, he had taken some countermeasures. But the countermeasures were merely defence-oriented ones, laying mines and deploying coast artillery, far from a head-on attack.

The reason was that there were not combat vessels, except the 2<sup>nd</sup> Torpedo Boat Group of five vessels.

To make matters worse, one of the five vessels was under repair, which meant only four were available.

The enemy's flotilla was composed of a 17 300-ton heavy cruiser, a 14 000-ton light cruiser and a 3 500-ton destroyer, and its equipment included 170 guns of various calibres, including 203mm guns, and several torpedo launchers, and their crew numbered more than 3 500 in total.

In particular, USS *Baltimore*, dubbed as a "floating island," was a giant, 205m long, 17 300t heavy and carrying 1 700 troops, 69 guns of various kinds and aircraft.

In contrast, a torpedo boat of the KPA Navy, 21m long and 17t heavy, was equipped with two torpedoes and one 12.7mm-calibre AA machine gun, and its crew numbered only seven.

The odds were too great against the KPA.

Kim Il Sung asked the commander if he had a particular plan for destroying the naval vessels with the strength of the Navy of the KPA.

The commander answered that it was next to impossible even if the navy was out in full force.

Kim Il Sung asked him again how much force would be needed then.

Considering the world history of naval warfare and balance of military hardware on the deck between the enemy and the KPA, he answered that scores of torpedo boats would be needed



plus support from aircraft.

Kim Il Sung said to him: Now our country does not have that many torpedo boats nor is capable of mobilizing aircraft for the navy; but we cannot sit with folded arms any longer when the enemy are raging and bombarding freely on the East Sea of Korea; the enemy flotilla is mooring on the sea off Mukho at night; we have to move the 2<sup>nd</sup> Torpedo Boat Group in stealth to the Port of Sokcho 50 miles away from Mukho; in case the group encounters the enemy flotilla unexpectedly during the manoeuvre, the commander of the group must make a prompt and accurate judgment of the situation and occupy a position favourable for mounting an attack against it.

If we are to attack such a big vessel as a heavy cruiser with torpedo boats, we have to apply close combat tactics; because a heavy cruiser is high-decked, it cannot fire at torpedo boats at a close range, he added.

The ideological and mental state of the sailors of the KPA was very good; having experienced both the miserable fate of slaves under Japanese colonial rule and a genuine life of man under the care of the people's government after the country's liberation, they were all filled with the determination to defend their country at the cost of their lives.

At 00:00 on July 2, 1950 the group left the Port of Sokcho.

When they arrived at the waters off Jumunjin, black columns of smoke could be seen, and then one enemy vessel after another came in sight.

Group Commander Kim Kun Ok (aged 22) aboard Torpedo Boat No. 21 raised an alarm.

As they approached, the silhouettes loomed larger and larger to materialize into giant warships. The flotilla was led by a light cruiser and followed by a heavy cruiser and then a destroyer.

The sailors continued to dash towards them. They were filled with confidence that they would surely win if they fought by applying guerrilla-style assault tactics as indicated by Kim Il Sung.

Kim Kun Ok selected the biggest ship, the heavy cruiser, as their primary target.

On his order, all the four torpedo boats charged towards the giant at full throttle.

Torpedo boat No. 24 stopped charging as it was hit by an enemy shell, but the other three boats broke through the area of concentrated fire and approached the heavy cruiser as near as 1 000 metres.

When torpedo boat No. 23, which was charging in front, reached a point only 800m away from the heavy cruiser, it fired a torpedo. The torpedo glided effortlessly and hit the target. There was a roar in the middle of the heavy cruiser, and a massive column of fire flared up.

Torpedo boat No. 21, which was following the former, approached the heavy cruiser as near as 550 metres and launched a torpedo. It also hit the target.

Kim Kun Ok ordered the other boats to charge to the heavy cruiser in a row.

Torpedo boat No. 21 entered the course for charge, but failed to fire a torpedo owing to the breakdown of the launcher, and slipped away between the heavy cruiser and the destroyer.

When the boat quickly manoeuvred back and was about 50-60 metres away from the enemy vessels, the enemy, as expected, were thrown completely off their balance.

Scores of enemy sailors were scurrying hither and thither on the deck of the heavy cruiser.

At the order of Kim Kun Ok, his sailors mowed them down with anti-aircraft machine guns.

The destroyer was tailing the torpedo boat on the starboard beam of the heavy cruiser, firing at it.

Kim Kun Ok ordered to put up a smoke screen.

Not long after a smoke screen was put up, the enemy destroyer changed direction and started to flee mistaking the smoke screen as a manoeuvre for attacking it.

Availing itself of this opportunity, torpedo boat No. 22 approached the heavy cruiser as near as 370 metres and launched a torpedo, hitting its middle part.

Hit by three torpedoes, the giant soon began to sink engulfed in fire.

At 09:10 on July 2, 1950, four hours after the battle started, the



US heavy cruiser *Baltimore* that was dispatched to the East Sea of Korea



arrogant heavy cruiser, which had lorded it over in the Pacific and Atlantic almost unchallenged, ceased its existence in the East Sea of Korea.

As torpedo boat No. 22 rapidly moved away to launch a second strike, the light cruiser came in front trying to block its way. The small boat fired another torpedo to it and seriously damaged it.

The battle ended in victory of the Navy of the KPA, demonstrating the mettle of the Korean people.

The group returned to its base with flying colours.

On receiving the report on the battle that day, Kim Il Sung praised the sailors of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Torpedo Boat Group, saying that they had fought very bravely and employed tactics skilfully in the battle and their feats of sinking a heavy cruiser and damaging a light cruiser with only four torpedo boats would shine brilliantly in the history of naval warfare not only of the KPA Navy but also of the world. He then extended his military greetings to the sailors.

And on July 8, he said:

High state commendations should be awarded to the sailors of 2<sup>nd</sup> Torpedo Boat Group, who performed undying exploits that would be etched in the history of the country and titles of Hero of the DPRK to the group commander for making a decisive contribution to achieving victory in the battle by commanding

the group skilfully and to the captain of torpedo boat No. 22 for playing a great role in sinking the heavy cruiser by making the two torpedoes accurately hit the target.

The two naval officers, with others, were awarded the title of Hero for the first time in the country, and later the title of Guards Unit was conferred on the 2<sup>nd</sup> Torpedo Boat Group.

# Set-to between Propellers and Jets

While the ground-force units of the KPA were closing in on the enemy's strongholds, its pilots fought heroically defending the sky of the country.

In those days the air force of the KPA was armed with propeller-powered planes which were incomparably inferior to the enemy planes in terms of speed and armament, and their pilots were greenhorns with no experience of air battle.

But the pilots fought bravely to defend the sky of their country.

On the day when the war broke out, Kim Il Sung called the commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Flying Wing. Saying that the KPA's Air Force was strong enough to deal a heavy strike to the enemy, he instructed the commander that his wing should conduct positive combat actions true to our strategic plan, thus backing up the operations of the KPA combined units that had switched over to the counterattack and defending the important facilities in the

rear from the enemy's air raid.

Then he said that the main force of the flying groups should act over the main thrust direction, striking the enemy's troops, facilities of military significance and supply routes and some of the interceptor group should conduct aerial reconnaissance over Munsan and Phochon areas and support the fighter group.

The Air Force of the KPA moved to counteroffensive, backing up the ground force thrusting towards Seoul. On the morning of June 25, the KPA 56<sup>th</sup> Interceptor Group bombed Kimpho, Suwon and Yongdungpho airports, destroying about 20 aircraft, or a half of the total number of the enemy's aircraft, scores of vehicles and nearly 10 000 tons of fuel at the first raid. At the outset of the war, the south Korean Air Force had about 40 aircraft and 80 pilots. And on 26, the KPA 36<sup>th</sup> Fighter Group raided Kimpho Airport, thus severely crippling the enemy's Air Force.

On 27, the 56<sup>th</sup> Interceptor Group attacked Yongdungpho Airport, destroying eight aircraft on the tarmac and shooting down two.

On 28, a group struck Suwon Airport and burned down the last



F-38 fighter, bomber and artillery command aircraft.

On 29, an interceptor squadron of the Phyonggang-based 56<sup>th</sup> Interceptor Group flew to Suwon Airport via Cholwon, Ryonchon and Seoul in escort of the 36<sup>th</sup> Fighter Group and destroyed eight enemy aircraft with the fighters.

As a result, the south Korean Air Force was knocked almost out of existence in a few days, not to revive until the end of the war.

Previously, the US imperialists had egged on the Syngman Rhee clique, assuring them that the south Korean army would not need to worry about air raid unless the Soviet Union joined the war. But the result was not what they had expected. Much alarmed by the successive reverses of the south Korean Air Force, they started to dispatch their aircraft to the Korean front.

They hurled over 80 bombers including B-29 of their 19<sup>th</sup> Heavy Bomber Group, 440 fighter-bombers of several other bomber groups, 345 aircraft on *Sicily* and other vessels, 72 strategic and tactical reconnaissance planes, 15 transporters and 108 aircraft of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army—about 1 100 aircraft in total—into the Korean front.

From June 26, the enemy started to bomb peaceful towns and rural villages in the northern half of Korea.

On June 29, Douglas MacArthur left Haneda Airport in Japan by his plane for an inspection of the Korean front together with the US air force commander in the Far East, his chief of staff Almond and his other lieutenants.

When their plane approached Suwon, their destination, the air force commander shouted he found an enemy plane.

All the passengers instinctively looked out and, to their consternation, they saw a KPA interceptor plane diminishing into distant clouds. But a greater danger was lurking in Korea. There was no airport for their plane to land, with Kimpho Airport already fallen into the hands of the KPA and Suwon Airport severely damaged. MacArthur's face turned pale, and his entourage wanted to return to Japan more than anything else.

The Western publications later reported that the frightened MacArthur issued an order in the plane to make an air raid on the north Korean airport, drawing a cross on his chest.

Unable to go back for fear of a censure by the White House,

his party managed to land on Suwon Airport, whose runways had almost been destroyed. At the moment when MacArthur, who got off the plane, was about to have talks with Syngman Rhee and Muccio (the then US ambassador to south Korea) who came out to greet him, a fighter of the KPA dived and began to strafe the airport.

Syngman Rhee and Muccio went under the wings of a plane, and MacArthur and others hurriedly fled to Taejon in disregard of the talks.

From that day the United States put B-29 heavy bombers into motion.

B-29 was reminiscent of a monster in a fairy tale, with the bedaubed fuselage three times that of an ordinary fighter and four motors attached with propellers on both long wings. The bullet-proof bomber could carry nine tons of bombs and was equipped with eight machine guns. The United States had boasted that it was a “sky fortress” as none of it had ever been shot down during the Second World War.

During the War in the Pacific, the Japanese kamikaze pilots, who had been said to have demonstrated the bravery of their

army, tried to strike the bombers, but failed to fly near them and were shot down by their powerful firepower; after that, they were all terrified just at the mention of the name of the bomber.

However, within a fortnight after the start of the war, the brave Korean pilots shot down B-29 and F-80, frustrating the enemy’s “air superiority.”

June 29 was the day MacArthur arrived in Suwon.

While making reconnaissance on the frontline area, Ri Hung Bu and Ri Mun Sun of the 56<sup>th</sup> Interceptor Group spotted in the air over Inchon and Seoul two B-29s heading north under the escort of four patrol aircraft.

Before leaving the air base, they had heard the news that B-29s and other US aircraft had committed a carpet bombing in Pyongyang.

Growing furious, they informed their command post of the situation and their decision to engage in a battle. The command post approved their decision, and gave an order to Kim Ki Ok, who was on patrol over Puchon west of the Han River leading a flight as its commander at the time, to support them.

The squadron soon headed for them.

The combat was an important battle decisive of the overall morale of the KPA Air Force for the future direction of its action.

The former two-aircraft flight zoomed. The enemy patrol aircraft also increased their altitude. The KPA flight again zoomed while flying in the same direction with their target, B-29, despite the side shooting by the enemy patrol aircraft. As their altitude reached about 500m above B-29, they made a descent and started firing from a height of 400m above the enemy aircraft.

A stream of fire came out from the guns mounted on the left and right sides and the tail of the enemy aircraft's fuselage, and it kept its flying course as if it were not afraid of anything. The firepower was so great that it was so difficult for the KPA planes to approach it. The firing by the bomber and other aircraft was threatening the KPA flight.

At this time, Kim Ki Ok's flight arrived and entered the battle. As his flight darted down and fired, the enemy patrol aircraft gave up their intentions and scattered hurriedly. Given the opportunity, the former flight increased their altitude in pursuit of the lead plane,

B-29. The aim was to find an empty space in the firepower of the enemy aircraft.

Squadron commander Ri Hung Bu called Ri Mun Sun and informed him that he would attack first, and then ordered him to make a bold dash after him while monitoring the distribution of the enemy plane's firepower. This was a decision that could be made by those who were ready to fight a do-or-die battle.

Noticing that he was determined to make a breakthrough single-handedly, Ri Mun Sun said that he would attack first. The squadron commander repeatedly ordered him to deal a second attack, and attacked the flank of B-29, which was continuing to fly towards the north.

There was a barrage of fire from B-29.

When they saw flames spurting from the squadron commander's aircraft, other pilots shouted at him to escape quickly, but while creating an opportunity for Ri Mun Sun to make a side attack, Ri Hung Bu ordered him to attack the enemy aircraft from below, before breathing his last.

Before the enemy pilot could regain his attention, Ri Mun Sun dashed to the enemy aircraft.



Bullets from his plane hit the enemy plane. It was a bull's-eye strike. A dark red smoke coiled up from the fuselage of B-29, followed by several streams of smoke, and an explosion of probably the bombs in the aircraft sounded with a flash, and the huge fuselage instantly broke into pieces.

It is often said that the practical ability of a pilot is decided by the log of his flight. When viewed from this angle, the US pilots were in general veterans with more than 1 000 hours of flying during the Second World War.

By comparison, the KPA pilots were novices with only about 40 hours of flying. But they defeated the enemy in the air battle.

Later, Kim Ki Ok shot down an F-80, a jet plane, with his propeller plane for the first time.

One day in early July 1950, his interceptor flight encountered an enemy flight in the sky over Seoul shortly after making its sortie.

F-80 was designed to perform the mission of an interceptor after dropping the bombs on the ground, and it could gain more speed after dropping the auxiliary fuel tanks attached to the tips of both wings.

At that time, the speed of F-80 was twice that of a propeller plane, and the former had more than six machine guns, even without counting the loaded bombs.

However, Kim Ki Ok was not embarrassed.

After passing by the KPA planes, the enemy planes flew in a single file, following the leading plane and drawing a wide circle. The enemy planes looked like eagles preying upon live animals.

The enemy's leading plane tried hard to tail behind Kim Ki Ok's plane, but every time he turned it away by zooming or diving from side to side, detecting a weak point of F-80, that it was so fast in speed that it had to make a large turning circle.

Kim Ki Ok informed the wingman of his decision to charge head-on to the enemy plane. The wingman backed him up so that he could attack smoothly.

The enemy's leading plane charged towards him trying to attack. When he thought it approached him close enough, Kim Ki Ok nosedived. Then he turned back and charged towards it, which was still tailing him.

Dumbfounded by his unexpected manoeuvres, the enemy pilot

started to shoot before Kim Ki Ok came into his firing range.

The distance between him and the enemy had rapidly reduced to merely hundreds of metres. Now he could see the face of the pilot of the enemy plane.

This was the moment he had been waiting for.

Now or never.

Kim Ki Ok pressed the fire button.

The enemy plane nosed up to dodge, but it was too late. A stream of bullets landed on the belly.

The enemy plane spiralled down into endless chasm engulfed in black smoke, before it exploded with a boom.

This was a showdown between a jet and a propeller-driven plane and between old hands and greenhorns, which foretold the outcome of the war.

In the air battle over Chonan and Taejon, Ri Tong Gyu shot down two enemy planes including a B-29 in a day, and Paek Ki Rak fought bravely in defence of Pyongyang every day and died a heroic death by dashing his plane into an enemy warship.

Kim Ki Ok, Ri Mun Sun, Ri Tong Gyu, Paek Ki Rak, Kim Hwa Ryong, Kang Sung Hyon and many other pilots were awarded the

title of the Hero of the DPRK for their bravery and self-sacrificing spirit.

During the Fatherland Liberation War, the KPA pilots and aircraft-hunters shot down thousands of American planes including B-29s and F-80s.

# Tragedy in Osan

An alarm was raised, following a report that a US ground-force unit had been detected on the Osan line on July 5.

At the outset of the war, the United States advocated that it would give Syngman Rhee only naval and aerial support, but as the war did not progress as it had expected, it started to publicly send its ground force to the Korean front.

Until recently, the Americans had claimed themselves as liberators of the Korean people. But now they cast off their mask and showed their true colour as their enemy.

Historically, it was in June 1855 when the existence of the United States was first known to Koreans. Around that time four foreigners had been rescued by Koreans from a deadly storm in the sea off Thongchon, Kangwon Province.

As they could not identify their nationality, Koreans sent the aliens to Qing China from a humanitarian standpoint. It was only then that they came to know that there was a country called the United States of America far away across the big water, and that the aliens were from that country.

However, Americans repaid Koreans' hospitality and kindness with hostility. They often intruded into Korea's territory and committed armed intervention against it. A typical example was the intrusion of the aggressor ship *General Sherman*.

This caused anger among Koreans.

Realizing that the south Korean army could not win the war on its own, MacArthur, under the approval of President Truman, ordered Walker, commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army, on June 30, 1950 to dispatch the elite 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to the Korean front.

Dean, commander of the division, formed an advance detachment with 400 best men selected from his division and reinforced it with the US 52<sup>nd</sup> Field Artillery Battalion. Charles Smith, commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the US 21<sup>st</sup> Regiment, was appointed to lead the detachment.

When he was leaving Japan for Korea, Dean instructed him to go up northward along the road between Pusan and Seoul and check the advance of the north Korean army in the north as much as possible, so as to ensure the deployment of the division's main force.

The Smith-led advance detachment came to Pusan from the



Itazuke air base in Japan by six C-54s on the morning of July 1, 1950 and arrived in Taejon by train on the following day.

Two days later Dean flew to Taejon and ordered the detachment to take up its defence positions along the Osan line.

At that time the US media gave much publicity to the effect that the detachment would reverse the unfavourable tide of war.

On July 5, the detachment advanced to the Kumam-ri line north of Osan by trucks guided by a former Japanese army officer clad in US army uniform, and took up positions on Height 118 and along railways and roads that passed the height.

Smith thought that the north Korean army, however strong it might be, would not dare to defy his unit which was armed with the latest weapons and with rich combat experience and tradition of victory, and his soldiers, accusing the fleeing south Korean soldiers, bragged that the victory would be theirs. At that time the US media reported that Smith had a key to putting the situation to rights.

The attention of the two belligerents was focused on Osan, Kyonggi Province.

It was because the result of the first battle between the powerful

US army and the young KPA would have a considerable bearing on the future of the war.

How would the KPA respond to the detachment of the “invincible” US 24<sup>th</sup> Division and how would the battle end?

On the basis of a scientific judgment of the prevailing situation and the attempts of the US imperialists, Kim Il Sung ensured that the KPA combined units on the front encircled and annihilated the remnant forces of the south Korean army in the Suwon area and then promptly proceeded to the Phyongthaek line to deal a decisive blow to the US army units.

Having set the US advance detachment as the main target of attack, he ordered the KPA units to increase the speed of attack with full combat readiness to annihilate the enemy as soon as they encountered them. The order was aimed at frustrating the enemy’s scheme to save the situation and encourage the south Korean soldiers by hurling their ground force into the Korean front.

The KPA units advanced southward with tank units in the front, pursuing the fleeing enemy. On the morning of July 5 the point company of the 9<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade encountered the advance detachment at Kumam-ri.

The company straightly charged without waiting for the tank and infantry units, which were five or six kilometers behind. The tanks penetrated deep into the enemy's defence lines, and destroyed all the 105mm howitzer guns of the US 52<sup>nd</sup> Field Artillery Battalion, before advancing to the area of Sojong-ri to cut off the route of the enemy's retreat and reinforcement.

Presently, they were joined by the tanks of the main-force units.

The advance detachment was completely encircled and destroyed in the almost one-sided battle of merely two hours.

About 370 were killed or captured without even firing their bazooka. Smith, now off his helmet, tunic and shoes, narrowly escaped to Ansong with his few men.

The destruction of the detachment was a flare signalling the collapse of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Division, an elite unit of MacArthur, and was reported as the breaking news in the world.

A US war correspondent described the battle as tragedy of Osan and a battle that marked the beginning of defeat, while Japanese military experts commented that the first battle of the US army in the Korean war was recorded as a crushing defeat and that the tragic flight of the US army started.

Even the publications of the capitalist countries that had been praising the US forces reported: Slightly-wounded soldiers were taken along, but seriously wounded ones were left behind covered with the Stars and Stripes; when they arrived at Ansong after sunset, many of them found themselves shorn of helmets, tunics and shoes; the first battle of the US forces in the Korean war was recorded as a crushing defeat.

Smith said: Today I narrowly escaped death. We were driven back without firing a shot in the face of the powerful advance of the courageous north Korean army. Victory was impossible from the beginning.

The reality proved that the north Korean army was far more powerful than we had thought it to be and we were not so strong an army as we claimed it to be. I don't think I can forget July 1950, when the US army, rather than we, suffered defeat. The shock from the wound is so deep that it will not be easy to get rid of defeatism. Many will think this way.

The day was July 4, the Independence Day of the United States, by the US Eastern time.

With confidence that the US army was not invincible but could be defeated, the KPA soldiers liberated Inchon, Phyongthaek,

Ansong, Jechon, Nyongwol, Samchok and other areas and advanced to the 37<sup>th</sup> Parallel through continuous attack. Their next target in the continuous offensive was Taejon.

## Model Battle of Encirclement in Taejon

After liberating Seoul three days after the start of the war, the combined units of KPA fought their way across the Kum River and deep into the enemy's area, closing in on Taejon.

At 09: 30 on July 16, 1950, a meeting on the encirclement of Taejon was held in the Front Command in Seoul under the guidance of Kim Il Sung.

Kang Kon, Chief of Staff of the Front Command, made a report on the situation created since the 14<sup>th</sup>, giving a detailed explanation of how the KPA combined units had crossed the Kum, where they were now and what the enemy were planning to do.

According to him, the Seoul 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> infantry divisions had already started to press the enemy hard to Taejon immediately after crossing the Kum and the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was achieving remarkable successes on the right flank of the Seoul 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

The Seoul 105<sup>th</sup> Tank Division was crossing a river in Kongju



as of the 16<sup>th</sup>.

The problem was the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, whose mission was to cut off the route of the enemy's retreat and reinforcement in the southeast of Taejon.

Although it had fought fierce battles, it failed to break the line of Phiban Pass south of Chongju.

This posed an obstacle for the completion of the encirclement of Taejon.

Meanwhile, the enemy were making frantic efforts to defend the city.

MacArthur's initial plan codenamed Blue Heart envisaged the US 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division repulsing the advance of the north Korean army on the line of the Kum and switching over to a new offensive together with the US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, which was supposed to land in Inchon.

But the plan was reduced to a piece of paper as the defence line on the Kum was rapidly broken through by the KPA.

As an emergency measure, MacArthur ordered the US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, which had left Yokohama in Japan for Inchon in Korea, to land in Phohang on the east coast of Korea and rush to Taejon to help the US 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

The US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was a crack unit, which had distinguished itself in numerous military activities including the extermination of American Indians. MacArthur, calling it an "invincible division," stationed it in Japan as an occupation force. Saying that he had never retreated during his military service of scores of years, the division commander bragged that his division would block the advance of the north Korean army.

The situation was pressing, and each of the two belligerent sides was racing against time to reach Taejon ahead of the other.

It was the core of the third operations of the KPA to occupy Taejon as soon as possible and encircle and annihilate the US 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and the south Korean 1<sup>st</sup> Corps. If successful, the third operations would enable the KPA to directly threaten Taegu while keeping the enemy from moving to the western sector of the front and to wedge its way to the southern coast by taking advantage of the situation when the enemy's front had not been connected yet.

After listening attentively to Kang Kon's report, Kim Il Sung said looking at the map: It would be good to exhort the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, but we must have a contingency plan; in case the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division fails to follow up its success, we may have to

give the task of cutting the enemy's retreat to the Seoul 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

He then instructed that the 83<sup>rd</sup> Motorcycle Regiment should be made a reserve for the western sector of the front, which had well-developed networks of roads and was in a plain area, and emphasized that thoroughgoing measures should be taken to supply weapons, ammunition and foods to the combined units in the direction of main attack.

And he continued: We must succeed in the operation of encircling Taejon; to this end, we should ensure that the Seoul 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division and Seoul 105<sup>th</sup> Tank Division press the enemy amassed in Taejon from the north and northwest, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division occupies the road southeast of the city and intercepts the enemy's retreat and reinforcement, the Seoul 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division advances in the direction of Ronsan and Namwon and the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division attacks in the direction of Kanggyong on the right flank; in this way we can create favourable conditions for the operation to liberate Taejon; the key point here is whether the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division active in the south of Chongju would be able to break through the enemy's defence and advance to the southeast of Taejon; we have to wait and see how the situation on the front

will develop, but judging from the positions and speed of attack of the combined units involved in the operation to liberate Taejon, we must have a contingency plan; if the main force of the Seoul 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division advances in the direction of Taejon, a void may be left in the direction which it has taken; to fill the void, a regiment of the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division should move in that direction; the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division alone is strong enough to deal with the enemy in the direction of the southwest coast.

Emphasizing once again that he had decided to manoeuvre the Seoul 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to Taejon, he said that it was important to send a regiment of the division to the southeast of Taejon on a mission to cut the roads between Taejon and Yongdong and between Taejon and Kumsan, and that he believed the 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment would carry out this task with credit.

It was a brilliant idea. The operations officers made an alteration to their plan for breaking the enemy's defence line in Chongju and moved the 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, which was advancing to the direction of Honam, to fill the gap in the encirclement of Taejon.

Kim Il Sung clarified the ways to destroy the besieged enemy as soon as possible.

He said: After the encirclement is completed, we should deliver

a decisive blow to the besieged enemy without giving them any time for action; to do so, the combined units in the north and northwest of Taejon should hit them hard from the front, and in the meantime small units should sneak into the city to surprise the enemy and confuse them; and the units southeast of the city should seize the roads there and attack the enemy forces in retreat and their reinforcements with powerful fire; the staff of the Front Command should see to it that the combined units taking part in the operation to liberate Taejon completely encircle and annihilate the enemy amassed in the area of Taejon by July 20 and promptly move to next operations; time is very precious; if the US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division which left Japan lands in Phohang, it can fully arrive in the Taejon line within two days after landing; so it is important to quickly make an operations plan down to the minutest detail and give tasks to units.

On July 18, 1950, the KPA combined units started to encircle Taejon.

Situated in South Chungchong Province, Taejon is a place of military importance as it links the southeastern and southwestern parts of Korea. And after driven out from Seoul, the enemy declared the city as their “temporary capital.” As it was such an important



The KPA soldiers on a forced march

city, the US imperialists hurled many of their crack units into the line to defend the city.

Dean gathered the entire forces of his division and organized a hasty defence.

This being the situation, the KPA combined units had to swiftly encircle and destroy the US 24<sup>th</sup> Division in Taejon before enemy reinforcements arrived.

The KPA 18<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment of the Seoul 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division advanced to the rear of the enemy from Ronsan through



A KPA tank advances to Taejon.

a forced march to cut off the enemy's retreat. The soldiers ran about 40km overnight to their designated place, each carrying his weapons, ammunition for one and a half battles, food for three days and shells for 82mm-calibre mortars.

Almost at the same time, another sub-unit completely blocked the road between Taejon and Kumsan.

On July 19, a tank unit liberated Yusong northwest of Taejon, and fought its way towards Taejon in high spirits.

The KPA Air Force units dependably covered the advancing infantrymen and tanks from the air raids by the numerically and technically superior enemy squadrons. They also assaulted the enemy's airports, rendezvous, railway bridges, troop trains and other facilities of military importance, harassing the enemy's ground force.

Finally, the KPA units got hold of all the roads in the south and southeast of Taejon, driving the enemy into an area of about 100km<sup>2</sup>.

Their manoeuvres were so swift and unexpected that, when he received on July 19 a report from a search party that they had detected the north Korean troops in Mt Kubong south of Taejon, Dean would not believe it, saying that the north Korean army, however quick it might be, could not make it to that area overnight.

Later, a veteran of the Korean war wrote: While attacking the defenders (US 24<sup>th</sup> Division) from the front bounding their freedom and forcing them to retreat, they (KPA) advanced to the rear of the defenders by means of detour or penetration movements



and cut their retreat. It was impossible for Dean or other officers to understand the situation in the rear from a certain point of view. It was a tactic that the American officers, accustomed to the European style of maintaining well-regulated front, could not understand until it was too late.

Having completed the encirclement of Taejon, the KPA combined units sent a small unit, composed of two tanks and an infantry sub-unit, to Taejon. The tanks caused a big stir in the city, crumpling scores of trucks and destroying ruling office buildings and other important targets.



A mechanized unit of the KPA storms into Taejon.

Having noticed that there were only two KPA tanks attacking them, the enemy offered fierce resistance. But they could not stop the tanks. The tanks kept on mowing down the enemy together with infantrymen.

At dawn on July 20, the KPA combined units launched an offensive in full force.

A tank unit and a combined infantry unit in the north was the first to move. Covered by fierce gunfire, tanks dashed forward, followed by motorcycles.

Soon the infantrymen flooded into Taejon from its north, northwest, west and southwest. Fierce battles were fought here and there. They were joined by the tanks and infantrymen that had entered the city in advance.

While the tanks stormed into the central part of the city, the following infantrymen seized the important buildings along the streets.

At the same time, an assault party neutralized the enemy's 155mm-calibre howitzers in the west.

The artillery units demolished the enemy's artillery emplacements, ammunition magazines, airport and other military facilities and wiped out their troops, backing up the tanks and

infantrymen with powerful fire.

The enemy put up stiff resistance by mobilizing tanks, guns and aircraft.

However, they could not stop the KPA units. Their command system and defences collapsing rapidly, the enemy troops gave up resistance and started to flee.

As soon as the KPA tanks showed up, the 34<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Division, which was armed with bazookas, fled in disarray

Captured Dean, the US 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division commander, and other US soldiers



without firing a shot. At that time bazooka was considered to be capable of destroying any type of tank in the world.

As a result, the belief of the United States that its tanks and other latest weapons would change the tide of the Korean war in its favour was shattered.

The enemy's command system was completely paralyzed, and the soldiers scattered in all directions to save their lives. Even regiment commanders disobeyed the division commander's orders.

Division commander Dean was taken captive while trying to escape to Kumsan clad in rank-and-file uniform.

Ironically, he was captured on the day of the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of his wedding after wandering for 36 days. When he was taken captive, he was in a miserable state, with unkempt hair and unshaven. During the period of one month of a fugitive life after the fall of Taejon, his body weight had reduced from 81kg to 58kg. But later he said to preliminary judges of the DPRK that the day when he had been captured was the second happiest day in his life.

Aware that they had no chance of defending Taejon, the remnants tried to escape through the road between Taejon and Kumsan after dumping cannons and other materiel into river. But they were killed en masse caught in a KPA's ambush.

When their attempt to run away to Kumsan failed, the enemy now took the road between Taejon and Yongdong. The infantry units that had been in ambush dealt a merciless blow to the enemy retreating in columns. Even though the enemy made desperate efforts to break the encirclement, bombarding and machine gun-firing with the tanks in the vanguard, it greeted its downfall.

On July 20, a complete liberation came to Taejon. In the operation, the KPA defeated the US 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, 1<sup>st</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> divisions of the south Korean army, and killed or captured tens of thousands of enemy troops including Dean, and destroyed or captured large numbers of tanks and vehicles and hundreds of guns of different calibres, tens of thousands of small arms and many other equipment.

After the operation, several units were awarded the title of Guards Unit and nine soldiers, the title of Hero of the DPRK.

By winning a brilliant victory in the Taejon area, the KPA put an end to the legendary tale of the US that was boasting of being the “strongest” in the world.

## Burning Island

Entering September 1950, a serious military and political situation was created on the front.

The United States, finding itself in the danger of being expelled for good from Korea due to the counterattack by the KPA, attempted to launch a “general offensive.” The “offensive” was aimed at landing large troops in Inchon, who would then occupy Seoul and advance to the areas on the 37<sup>th</sup> Parallel and the Taejon and Wonju areas, joining them with the troops that would launch attacks on the Raktong River line at the same time as cutting the link between the front and the rear of the KPA, thus “encircling and annihilating” the main forces of the KPA on the Raktong River line.

It schemed to land on Inchon and form a new powerful front in the central part of Korea, and, by doing so, to join the counterattack around the zone of the Raktong River, so as to encircle and destroy the main units of the KPA and occupy the whole of Korea quickly.

To this end, it threw into the narrow line of the Raktong River the whole forces of the US 1<sup>st</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> corps and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> corps

of the south Korean army. Furthermore, for the landing operation in Inchon, it formed the 10<sup>th</sup> Corps by combining several units, including its 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and the south Korean 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment, as well as two landing echelons.

Along with this, so as to ensure its 10<sup>th</sup> Corps' landing on Inchon, it formed the US 7<sup>th</sup> Combined Fleet with the vessels of the south Korean army and its other satellite countries; the backbone of the fleet was the US 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet. And it decided to mobilize about 1 000 aircraft affiliated to its Fifth Air Force and the air force of its Far East Navy.

With a scientific insight into the prevailing military and political situation, Kim Il Sung put forward the strategic line for the second stage of the war—to delay the enemy's advance as much as possible in order to secure time and thus rescue the main force of the KPA and organize reserve units with which to form powerful counteroffensive forces while organizing a planned retreat.

The first step to implementing the policy was the battle to defend Wolmi Island.

Covering an area of 0.66km<sup>2</sup> and located 800m west of the seat of Inchon, the island was named so as it looks like the tail of the moon. (*Wol* means moon, and *mi*, tail). It had been bustling with

the visitors for the thick pine forests on the coast.

Though it was small, it was of great significance in view of military strategy as it is situated in the southernmost of Inchon, a gateway to Seoul, and stands on the sea route to the port of Inchon while being linked to the seat of the city through breakwater. If the enemy had to land in the area of Inchon, they had no other alternative than to pass the island.

The enemy mobilized for the operation huge forces, more than 50 000 troops, hundreds of naval vessels and 1 000 aircraft.

At that time, on the island were a Ri Tae Hun-led company with four guns under the KPA Navy Headquarters and a company of the 64<sup>th</sup> Coastal Infantry Brigade of the KPA.

On September 10, 1950, the enemy started bombing and bombarding the island.

This lasted for three days.

The thick forests on the island were rooted out and burned, the rocks crushed, and even the water off the island seemed boiling.

On September 13, they began landing operations. Following the bombing by aircraft, the vessels sailed towards the burning island in a regular fighting formation.

Destroyers, gunboats, heavy cruisers, landing boats and



minesweepers were only 2 000m away from the island while the fighters were threatening it in the sky.

Reported by a squad leader that the enemy vessels were as near as 800m away, Ri Tae Hun, company commander, ordered to fire.

At last, the coastal artillery began to fire.

From the first fire, they were accurate. The third destroyer was hit by nine shells in a few minutes and engulfed in flames.

The commander, who was observing the battle, now ordered to fire against the destroyer in the vanguard.

An enemy destroyer, just like another, was engulfed in the flames on the sea route, hindering the landing ships behind from turning away.

Frightened by the first strike that chopped their battle array, the enemy poured bombs on the island.

The company commander ordered to stop firing, looking anxiously at his watch.

It was because when the tide was out and the bottom of the water was revealed, the enemy vessels would become unable to escape but be stuck in the mud.

It was too late when the enemy realized this. Already, many vessels were placed on the mud. Though some of them were

still floating on the sea, they were unable to return as a damaged destroyer was checking their route. They threatened the destroyer and turned their guns to it, demanding that it open the route.

Watching this at the command post, Ri Tae Hun ordered to take aim and fire.

Flames flared up and black smoke spread again on the enemy vessels.

At the battle of the first day, the company destroyed two destroyers and sank two other vessels.

Next day MacArthur personally directed the operation.

The enemy showered the island with bombs and shells for three hours.

When the enemy vessels were approaching the coast, the coastal artillery opened fire.

A destroyer listed, belching out black smoke, and four landing vessels behind it were on fire. A pandemonium broke loose in the enemy's formation. A while later, two other landing vessels trying to flee were hit. The enemy's another attempt was foiled.

Wolmi Island seemed to be an unsinkable warship. The battle inflicted a considerable loss also upon the defenders. Two guns were destroyed, some soldiers were killed and not many shells were left.

Though most of the survivors were exhausted or seriously wounded, they repaired the emplacements and guns, vowing revenge upon their fallen comrades by their graves.

Angry with his repeated failures, MacArthur gave an order of general attack at 02:30 on September 15. His aim was to use the tide which would begin to flow in soon.

As if it had nothing to do with the war on the earth, the force of the moon's gravity continued to control the earth's tide as it had done before.

The nearest high tide time was at 06:59 and 19:19 on September 15, and the sun set around 18:44. So, if they missed the opportunity, the enemy could have another chance of landing on October 11 or November 2. After October, however, seasonal wind would blow on the West Sea of Korea, making it disadvantageous for ships to sail.

Therefore, MacArthur had to succeed in landing on September 15.

From dawn the enemy indiscriminately bombed Wolmi Island.

The aircraft made sorties for more than 100 times and dropped as many as 3 000 bombs on the small island for 15 minutes just before landing began.

The enemy's another landing operation started.

The defenders fired at the assailing enemy with their one and only gun; when they ran out of shells, they fired machineguns. They sank two enemy vessels and mowed down the troops who had managed to land on the tidal flat.

As enemy tanks rolled on, the company commander saw that time had come for the final battle.

The company sent a telegraphic message reflecting their firm determination to fight to the last man as befit soldiers of General Kim Il Sung. When the last signal was delivered, the company commander shouted, "Comrades, forward for General Kim Il Sung!" and charged forward. His men followed him.

By sinking or damaging 13 enemy vessels including three destroyers for three days between September 13 and 15, the defenders of Wolmi Island prevented the enemy from landing, thus giving time to the KPA units defending the Inchon and Seoul areas and making a great contribution to the overall defence operations in the region.

The units defending the Inchon and Seoul areas held out for 14 days, assuring the organizational retreat of the main-force units of the KPA.

Later AP reported that it was a conundrum how the north Korean army in the southern part of the front had eluded the pursuing UN forces, that they had disappeared into thin air, and the point was where the soldiers armed with military equipment had gone.

The US forces' frenzied offensives could not check the organizational retreat of the KPA units and people. The KPA rapidly built up counteroffensive forces and switched over to counteroffensive in late November 1950.

## Large-scale Encirclement and Annihilation Operations

The arduous strategic temporary retreat, which started in late September 1950, ended in late November 1950, effecting a fundamental change in the tide of war.

On the night of November 25, 1950, the newly-organized units of the KPA launched a powerful counteroffensive, thwarting the "Christmas general offensive" that MacArthur had advertised so much.

The KPA units on the second front actively backed up the powerful attack of the KPA main-force units. Based in the mountain regions in South Phyongan, Kangwon and Hwanghae provinces, they liberated one enemy-held area after another while cutting their supply routes and disturbing their rear.

The enemy's general offensive, for which they had enlisted five corps, had many weak points.

First, fear and pessimism were widespread among the soldiers in the face of the strong resistance and counterattack of the KPA and ever-increasing number of them fled the ranks or avoided

engaging in battles.

Second, their operation plan and command system had essential weaknesses.

As they were unconnected to each other, separately commanded by MacArthur in Tokyo, the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army and the 10<sup>th</sup> Corps deployed on the 400km from the estuary of the Chongchon River to the Orang River were failing to fight in a coordinated way.

US Secretary of State Acheson wrote in his book, titled, *Korean War*: General Walker's 8<sup>th</sup> Army in the west and General Almond's 10<sup>th</sup> Corps in the east were far away from each other and their flanks were dangerously exposed to the Communist army. Coordination between them was based on the information from Tokyo. But when they received the information, it was 30 hours late. Moreover, these two units were growing more divided. They lacked ability to support each other.

In addition, the enemy's forces were not strong enough even though they had committed almost all their reserves to the front, and the scanty remainder had to be diverted to operations to counter the ever-intensifying moves of the KPA's second-front units.

Notwithstanding this situation, MacArthur, claiming to be Napoleon in the East, clamoured that he would end the Korean war

before Christmas. He hurled for the "Christmas general offensive" the 1<sup>st</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> corps and over ten elite divisions and brigades into the western sector of the front and five to six divisions of the 10<sup>th</sup> Corps into the eastern sector.

When MacArthur was making preparations for the "offensive," Kim Il Sung saw through the enemy's scheme and worked out a plan to turn their "general offensive" into a general retreat.

On the morning of November 25, 1950, he called the Chief of the General Staff of the KPA to the field command post of the Supreme Headquarters, and gave him an order to launch counteroffensive from the western sector of the front first.

On his order, the KPA mounted counterattack on the evening of the day, which signalled the start of the operations to bring the enemy's "general offensive" to naught.

Shortly after the start of the operations, the KPA units besieged the US Army units along the Chongchon River.

The Chongchon is a big, limpid river flowing through Anju, Kaechon, Kujang, Hyangsan and other areas in the middle part of Korea.

The fierce counterattack by the combined units of the KPA broke the attacking formations of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army to pieces.

According to Kim Il Sung's plan, the KPA 1<sup>st</sup> Corps in the western sector of the front was supposed to persistently hold the enemy out. The units on its left flank would switch over to a counterstrike and wipe out the enemy's main forces and then promptly advance to the areas in front to block the enemy's retreat. Meanwhile, the units on the right flank would assail the enemy to encircle and wipe out them in the Chongchon River area.

Several sub-units of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps attacked the assembly points and command posts in the enemy's rear, throwing them into confusion and creating favourable conditions for the counteroffensive by the main forces of the KPA.

While the KPA combined units in the Unsan area smote the US 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from the front and both flanks, the main force of the 46<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division in the Thaechon area frustrated the attack by the main force of the US 1<sup>st</sup> Corps, smashed the British 27<sup>th</sup> Brigade on November 27 and captured Jongju through joint efforts with the neighbouring units.

On November 26, the KPA combined units on the Kujang-Nyongwon line dealt a fatal blow to the US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division that had been attacking along both sides of the Chongchon, and advanced, expanding their success.

The Guards 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division of the 5<sup>th</sup> Corps of the KPA was dispatched to the enemy's rear to reinforce the second front in the lead-up to the counteroffensive. On its way, the division attacked the south Korean 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps from behind, backing up the moves of the main-force units.

In those days, the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps of the south Korean army, massed in the Nyongwon area, was making desperate attempts to frustrate the attack by the Korean People's Army under the cover of guns of various calibres by relying on the favourable mountain terrain.

Under the consideration that they could exploit the previous successes only when they destroyed the enemy in the Nyongwon area, the KPA units surrounded the area on three sides and attacked them.

With a powerful counterattack, the KPA combined units pressed the US 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> infantry divisions and the south Korean 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division to the Kaechon area within a few days.

The surrounded enemy swarmed to the Chongchon River area.

The KPA combined units, which were advancing towards Kujang and Kaechon true to the operation plans of Kim Il Sung, conducted a battle to encircle and wipe out the main force of the



US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division in the Kaechon area.

The US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division suffered a heavy loss; the valleys in the area were littered with the corpses of the US soldiers and damaged tanks, guns and trucks.

The division commander, who managed to save his life, ran away first after ordering his men, “Get out of here at your best.”

Surprised, Commander Walker of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army hurled the US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division and a Turkish brigade in the second echelon into the front to ensure the retreat of the US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division and the south Korean 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps.

The US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, which had suffered a great loss on the Raktong River line and managed to get reinforcement of troops and weapons, attacked in the direction of Unsan on Walker’s order.

When the division commander, leading his 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment and the south Korean 15<sup>th</sup> Regiment, entered the southern part of Unsan, the US 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment that was following them was surprised by the KPA units while crossing the Kuryong River. To make the matters worse, the US 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment and the south Korean 15<sup>th</sup> Regiment were completely encircled.

Having realized that his fate was on stake, the division commander ran away after telling a lie to his chief of staff that he

was called urgently by the Corps Command.

Meanwhile, over 5 000 soldiers of the Turkish brigade, who came to the Korean front in October 1950, advanced from Kaechon towards Tokchon.

The KPA combined units, which were lying in ambush at vantage points near a mountain path in the Kunu-ri area, showered fire on the Turkish soldiers. With the shrieking sounds of hand-grenades and volleys of machine guns and mortars, the valley of Kunu-ri was covered with flames.

The collapse of the Turkish brigade was so pitiable that even a publication of a capitalist country wrote that the battle was disastrous, and that the brigade, which had had 5 000 soldiers, was reduced to two companies of strength on the morning of the next day.

A south Korean publication wrote:

“On November 27, 1950, the upstream of the Chongchon and Taedong and the Rangnim Mountains were strewn with the bodies of the soldiers of the UN forces and the National Defence Army, who had been encircled and annihilated by the Communist army. The mountains and valleys were covered with the US latest weapons. Having failed to open the path of retreat and suffering

from hunger and biting cold, the remnants wandered the valleys of the Rangnim and Myohyang mountains before surrendering to the Communist army one after another.”

The US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division lost 65 per cent of its troops and equipment, and the 9<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> regiments of the US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, 24<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the US 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and the Turkish brigade were nearly wiped out.

While the KPA ground units were attacking the main forces of the enemy in the area of the Chongchon River, its Air Force dealt a blow at the enemy in the air over Sinuiju, Kanggye, Anju and Pyongyang and bombed the enemy airports, arsenals and military trains.

In this way, the KPA combined units in the areas of major attack drove the main forces of the enemy in the western sector of the front into overall destruction in three to four days.

Upset by the setback, MacArthur issued a statement on November 27, that read that the United States faced a completely different war, and that the new phase shattered its hope. He then sent a telegram to Truman requesting permission for retreat and reinforcement of some 70 000 troops.

The next day he called Walker and Almond to Tokyo to discuss the ways for rescuing the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army from crisis. Seeing that

there was no way to save the situation, he admitted the complete defeat of his “Christmas general offensive” and ordered a retreat to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.

Having crushed the main forces of the enemy, which were advancing to the northern half of Korea, boasting of their numerical and technical superiority, the KPA combined units in the western sector of the front, in soaring spirits, liberated Anju in early December 1950 after crossing the Chongchon River in chase of the enemy remnants and advanced towards Mundok and Sukchon.

## Walker Joins the Majority

On December 13, 1950, Lieutenant General Wilton Walker, commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army, was killed by a mine on a road in Jongok-ri, Ryonchon County, Kyonggi Province.

During the Korean war, Walker ordered his soldiers as follows:

Don't let your hands tremble even when those who appear before you are children or old people. Kill them! In doing so you will be saving yourselves from ruin and fulfilling your responsibilities as soldiers of the UN forces.

According to his order, during the strategic temporary retreat of the Korean people, mass slaughter was committed in the areas held by the enemy soldiers.

Walker's death in the lead-up to Christmas was not accidental.

On November 30, 1950, when the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army was fleeing hastily after its defeat on the Chongchon River, Kim Il Sung called the Chief of the General Staff of the KPA to the Supreme Headquarters to issue an order for the second-front units to carry

out raiding on a large scale in the enemy's rear.

Already having grasped the enemy's intentions when the KPA launched a general counterattack and when they began an overall retreat, Kim Il Sung put forward the policy, new tactics for wiping out more of the enemy's manpower and weapons.

In those days, the enemy were making desperate efforts to check the attack by the KPA; they were hurling huge forces and combat equipment into the areas centring on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

This being the situation, if the KPA combined units in the western sector of the front were to expand the successes of counterattack and liberate completely the northern half of the country at a blow, it was necessary to attack Ryonchon so as to prevent the enemy from building its defence lines.

The prerequisite for this task was forceful destruction activities in the enemy-held areas as well as an attack on Ryonchon.

Based on this analysis, Kim Il Sung ordered the Chief of the General Staff to organize demolition teams by enlisting the 1<sup>st</sup> Engineer Brigade directly under the Supreme Headquarters and dispatch them to the divisions under the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> corps in the enemy-held areas as it was difficult to wage demolition

activities on a large scale in these areas only with the sappers of the corps.

Kim Il Sung stressed:

We should organize eleven demolition teams with sturdy and experienced soldiers from the 1<sup>st</sup> Engineer Brigade by tomorrow. You should order the director of the Engineers Bureau to equip the teams with necessary weapons and combat equipment, and inform them of their mission in detail and check their combat preparedness before dispatching them.

Giving his opinions on how the second-front units should receive and use the teams in the large-scale demolition activities, he instructed that members of the demolition teams should be assigned as technicians to the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> corps after the demolition activities were over so that they could train sappers in the divisions under the corps.

The next day, he called the Chief of the General Staff again along with the director of the Operations Bureau, and instructed that large-scale demolition activities should be organized in the lead-up to Christmas.

True to his order, the second-front units of the KPA waged demolition activities extensively after giving the sappers an

intensive short course and training, striking the enemy with terror.

In the midst of these activities, the Engineering Regiment of the 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division under the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps killed the enemy soldiers including Walker, commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army, who had come to the Ryonchon area accompanied by his 80 staff officers.

In those days, the enemy, in order to form a defence line in the western sector of the front along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, were concentrating their troops in the areas centring on Ryonchon, located west of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and not so far from Seoul.

They misjudged that as the second-front units of the KPA had been concentrated for ambush on the Rimjin River line, the other areas were easy to be attacked. So in an attempt to fall back on switch positions in the Ryonchon area, they hurled a regiment supported by a mechanized unit into the area with some more reserve forces.

The battle to liberate Ryonchon was of great significance in carrying out the order of Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung to sweep away the enemy forces in the northern half of Korea by the end of the year, and strengthening the fighting capability of

the second-front units by capturing ammunition and shells from the enemy.

With a view to thwarting the enemy's attempt, the 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and its 87<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment (renamed 1<sup>st</sup> Mobile Regiment in October 1950) sneaked in, besieging Ryonchon, and mounted attack at the dawn of December 13.

And sappers were sent together with infantrymen to the road between Ryonchon and Seoul which was supposed to be the most probable escape route of the enemy.

The US 8<sup>th</sup> Army had made some achievements until they reached the Chongchon River where they suffered a fatal blow. Walker, its commander, had come to Ryonchon from Seoul to encourage his men. His schedule included inspecting of the US 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and British 29<sup>th</sup> Brigade, which had been pushed back to the area of Ryonchon, and conferring a commendation on his son who was serving as an operations officer in the infantry division.

Around the time when he came to the Ryonchon area, the KPA 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division on the second front was closing in on the area.

The task of blocking the retreat route of the enemy fell to a

platoon of the sappers battalion directly under the division. A demolition team headed by platoon leader Choe Jong Un arrived at Jongok-ri, Ryonchon County, at midnight.

As Jongok-ri was a vantage point along the sole road between Ryonchon and Seoul, the enemy had to pass the place when they tried to retreat.

After disguising himself as an enemy officer, he reconnoitred enemy movements, and ordered his men to bury mines on the road.

At dawn the KPA 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division started to attack Ryonchon and destroyed the besieged enemy.

Ryonchon was turned into a stirred hornet nest. The enemy lost more than 1 400 soldiers in an instant. The surviving soldiers gave up resistance and ran towards Seoul for life.

Realizing that he had no chance, Walker joined the flight with his aide. He took the wheel of his armoured car and drove it, seeking a place which seemed to be less dangerous.

When the procession with a tank in front entered the place where mines had been planted, powerful explosions went off, breaking the tread of the tank and turning the armoured car upside down.

At this moment Choe Jong Un charged towards the enemy,



shouting to his men, “Death to the enemy, to the last man!”

The enemy were annihilated soon.

While searching the battlefield, the KPA soldiers were surprised to find a US general beside the armoured car. It was Walker.

A medal and its certificate were scattered around the body of the general.

On January 22, 1951, the then Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK conferred the title of the Hero of the DPRK on Choe Jong Un for his bravery in killing or capturing about 80 enemy soldiers including Walker and frustrating the enemy’s attempt for reinforcement by blowing off a bridge over the Hanthan.

Despite this historical fact, enemy’s publications wrote about the death of Walker in this way:

The UN forces lost a useful general when the situation was at its grimmest. On December 13 Lieutenant General Walker was killed when his car collided with a south Korean army truck while he was on his way to confer commendations. Formalities were on progress for his promotion to four-star general. But he, unaware of this, died at the age of 60.

The news of his death struck the enemy with terror, and gave

encouragement to the KPA soldiers.

After he was killed, the US soldiers started to be scared of the mountains and roads in Korea, and they did not trust even their tanks and armoured vehicles. Fear of war prevailed among them. No place was safe for them in Korea. Wherever they went, they were waited by unexpected assault or mines, “special gifts” sent by the KPA soldiers to them before Christmas.

The US 8<sup>th</sup> Army commander Walker killed and means of transport damaged in Jongok-ri



## “Do Not Yield Even an Inch of Land to the Enemy!”

A year had passed since the Korean war started.

By June 1951 the front was fixed basically along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, from where the war had started.

After their plan to finish the Korean war in a short period failed, the US authorities fought shamelessly among themselves, each trying to shift the responsibility for the failure to the other.

While MacArthur blamed Truman, Truman’s supporters demanded that the grave military mistakes the general had made in Korea be investigated.

The fight ended with Douglas MacArthur being dismissed for the failure in Korea.

Marshall, the then Secretary of State, said: The myth has blown away. We were not so strong a nation as others had considered.

To make matters worse, the US authorities were faced with strong protest and denunciation at home and abroad.

Having suffered huge manpower and material losses in a year of the war, the United States frantically tried to find a new way for attaining the objective of the war.

*“Do Not Yield Even an Inch of Land to the Enemy!”*

It schemed to launch an attack to make a breakthrough on the ground front and landing operations on the eastern and western coasts.

This led the war to assume a protracted character.

To cope with the prevailing military and political situation, Kim Il Sung advanced a new strategic policy for the fourth stage of the war to thwart the enemy’s all attempts for offensive and deal a crushing blow to them, thereby winning final victory in the war.

The strategic policy envisaged defending the positions along the front and ceaselessly weakening the enemy by waging active positional warfare and, in the meantime, further strengthening the combat efficiency of the KPA and consolidating the rear to create all conditions for achieving the final victory.

The KPA units moved to active positional warfare in mid-June 1951.

Pursuant to Kim Il Sung’s plan, they built strong tunnels and fortified positions in their areas on the front.

On July 14, 1951, Kim Il Sung instructed the deputy commander of the Supreme Headquarters in charge of military affairs as follows:

According to our strategic policy for the fourth stage of the war, we should launch active positional warfare so as to ceaselessly

strike and annihilate the enemy while preserving our troops and combat and technical equipment; all the units on the front should build stronger tunnels, combat trenches, communication trenches and pillboxes so that they can wage active positional warfare along the lines they are holding now.

When he visited a place where the soldiers were digging a tunnel, he said:

You should make the tunnel strong enough to stand even an atomic bomb. To do so, you should use reinforced concrete, instead of wood props, where the rock conditions are poor. You should also build a bullet-proof wall at the entrance to the tunnel and curves and shelters in it.

The KPA soldiers built strong tunnels in a short span of time, fortifying the defence system along the eastern and western coasts with impregnable tunnels.

The tunnel-based positions were reinforced with more guns.

In consideration of the topography of the country, where mountains account for nearly 80% of the territory, a large number of howitzers were assigned and direct-firing guns were pulled up onto the heights along the front so as to deal with the enemy's pillboxes and tanks on hills and mountains. In addition, mobile artillery companies were organized in coastal artillery units to

combat enemy ships.

The number of guns, let alone mortars, more than doubled between July and August 1951. The enemy cried that the front was engulfed in flames due to the artillery attacks of the Communist army.

The tunnel tactic was an original one, different from its previous versions.

The previous tunnels were not strong or deep enough to withstand bombing and bombardment.

But, connected with fortified field positions, the KPA's tunnels were strong shelters for preserving soldiers and combat



The KPA soldiers dig a tunnel.

equipment and overpowering the enemy in modern war where incomparably powerful gun fire and aerial strike were applied and weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons were mobilized.

On December 27, 1951, Van Fleet, commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Corps, told Ridgway, commander of the US forces in Far East, in the following vein:

The positions of the Communist army are so fortified with tunnels that any attack would be futile with ordinary preliminary shelling. It will only claim many lives. Even if we may gain benefits, that would be too small compared to the death toll we would suffer.

Driven into a tight corner, the United States formally proposed ceasefire talks on June 30, 1951.

The talks started on July 10, 1951.

But the United States, with a sinister design for a new military adventure, amassed huge forces in the western and eastern sectors of the front behind the scenes of the talks.

Seeking what it called an “honourable truce,” it committed large troops to the eastern sector of the front and stepped up preparations for landing in Wonsan and Thongchon on the east coast, while pretending to launch a powerful offensive in the



The KPA soldiers shower shells on the enemy.

western sector of the front.

On his inspection of the front, Ridgway ordered his generals to consolidate the front, make up for the loss of soldiers and supply the front-line units with weapons and ammunition necessary for an extensive attack during the armistice talks.

And Van Fleet, commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army, supplied large numbers of troops and combat equipment to the front, saying that an agreement in the ceasefire talks was possible only when the UN forces achieved military victory.

On July 11, 1951, Kim Il Sung summoned Choe Yong Gon,

deputy commander in charge of military affairs, to the command post of the Supreme Headquarters in Konji-ri.

Kim Il Sung asked Choe what he thought about the enemy's recent moves on the front.

Choe answered that he thought that the enemy were planning a military offensive.

Kim Il Sung said:

My analysis of the recent enemy moves both on the front and in the rear gives me a hint that they are obviously planning a new offensive. I think they would turn to a military pressure now that they know they could hardly attain their brigandish aim at the ceasefire talks in the face of our principled and unyielding stand. And I am sure it will develop into a new offensive.

Then, he asked Choe Yong Gon if he had any idea about what the enemy were seeking in the new offensive.

Choe replied he thought that the enemy might try to move the front up the north.

It might be part of their important aim, Kim Il Sung said, and noted:

The enemy are seeking to occupy points of strategic importance on the front by combining attacks on the ground front and landing on the coast, and then move the front up so as to

attain an "honourable truce." This is surely what the enemy are seeking in the new offensive.

He was deep in thought for a good while. Then, he said: In order to frustrate the enemy's plan, we should make a correct judgment of their main thrust direction before fixing the main direction of our defence operations and concentrate our forces and equipment.

Now he asked Choe again if he had any idea about the enemy's main thrust direction.

After a moment of thinking, Choe gave his opinion, saying that he could hardly make a proper judgment and that he, however, was of the opinion that they were having an eye on the western sector of the front.

The reasons of his argument were: The enemy had oriented their major thrust in the first and second stages of the war to the western sector. In this direction there was a well-developed network of manoeuvring routes compared to the mountainous regions in the eastern and central sectors of the front. The US invaders were not only clumsy in mountain warfare but also afraid of it. Their weapons and combat equipment did not fit the mountainous regions nor were effective there. The western region was a major granary. At the moment there was a massive



concentration of the enemy forces in the western sector of the front.

After hearing his argument, Kim Il Sung said:

I understand your judgment. So far, the enemy has usually directed the thrust of their offensive to the western sector. The sector is favourable for the movement of their combat equipment, and this is not the case with the eastern sector. Still, could that be a sure reason for our judgment that they would orient their major thrust to the western sector? Nay. As far as their offensive is concerned, they are seeking to take the eastern sector this time, not the western one. I think their scheme is to take the mountainous regions in the eastern and central sectors of the front, which are of strategic importance, by landing their seaborne troops in the Wonsan and Thongchon areas and then having them join the ground forces' offensive.

Surprised at the logic, Choe said that the enemy were manoeuvring their units to the western sector while deploying their artilleries close to their defence lines and bombarding coastal areas by hurling their naval vessels into the West Sea, asking how we should approach this situation.

Kim Il Sung explained:

It is no more than a trick of theirs. The crafty and insidious

Americans are attempting to make us mistake the direction of their attack and thus make us reinforce our forces in the western sector. Then they would hurl their main forces into the eastern sector. And I believe that in the eastern sector they will set Height 1211 as their main target.

After giving the reason for his judgment, he went on confidently that we still had to watch further moves of the enemy, but the recent analysis of the enemy situation was assuring him of such a conclusion.

His words were based on a scientific analysis of the overall scheme of the enemy, deployment of their forces, characteristics of their actions, geographical features of the eastern sector of the front and their effects on military actions.

Around the time the enemy also had got an understanding of the KPA to a certain extent. As they knew that the KPA, compared to their own forces, was absolutely short of weaponry and mobile equipment, especially vessels and aircraft, they were still resorting to the scheme of landing operations on the eastern coast, the kind of which had already brought them "success" in Inchon, by availing themselves of their air supremacy, overwhelming firepower and developed means of transport.

In this respect they saw the Wonsan and Thongchon areas as

good landing places, rather than the west coast where there is a great difference between high and low tides.

The thorn in the flesh for them was the mountainous areas in the eastern sector of the front. They were well aware that they, without seizing the areas, would hardly be able to land their forces in the Wonsan and Thongchon areas.

What was of particular military and strategic importance there was Height 1211. Lying between Yanggu and Jiktong Pass and between Rinje and Ipho-ri in the eastern sector of the front, the height commands the control of the roads to inland areas as it links Mt Taeu, Kachil Peak, Mae Peak and other places.

In fact, in early July the enemy drove the US 10<sup>th</sup> Corps and the south Korean 1<sup>st</sup> Corps to attack Mt Taeu (1 178m) under the nose of Height 1211 on the Yanggu line. This was part of the reason for the conclusion that the thrust of their new “offensive” was directed to the eastern sector of the front.

They must have learned that since Ridgway’s style of operations and temperament based on the tactic of persistent step-by-step occupation was exposed bare, the KPA would now have no problem in dealing with them. Thus, they decided to launch a surprise attack in the eastern sector, employing a different tactic from Ridgway’s. They assured themselves that their surprise attack

would certainly emerge successful as they thought the KPA was more interested in the western or central sector, that the eastern sector was disadvantageous for mountain-based defence, and that the number of routes for logistics supply for the KPA units in the eastern sector was fairly limited.

In the eastern sector of the front there is a range of mountains with precipitous faces along the eastern coast from Myongpha-ri to Wonsan, with ridges extending as far as to the seaside. There were also roads leading to the inland regions. The eastern sector’s geographical features provided another probability of the enemy’s attempt for landing operations.

Kim Il Sung gave instructions that we must set out right now to get fully ready to thwart the new offensive of the enemy while watching their movements with a sharp eye.

At an operations conference of the Supreme Headquarters in late July, Kim Il Sung disclosed again the aim of the enemy’s adventurous “summer offensive,” and advanced measures for frustrating the offensive at a stroke.

The enemy started their “summer offensive” on August 18, 1951, with massive bombarding and air raids. All of a sudden, shells fell on the positions of the KPA with flashes piercing the sky and horrible shrieks, rending the stillness in the mountains.

At the same time, bombers dropped strings of bombs, while a huge number of vessels on the East Sea shelled the heights, turning them into a sea of flames.

Then, the US 10<sup>th</sup> Corps and the south Korean 1<sup>st</sup> Corps, using six of their first-echelon divisions, committed preliminary shelling for 3-4 hours, at the same time as bombing, on a nearly 50km-long section of the frontline. After that, they launched an attack with the thrust directed to the area covering Height 1211, Jiktong Pass and Kumgang, concentrating their forces on the main heights under the cover of tanks.

Van Fleet, commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army, talking to correspondents immediately after the start of the “summer offensive,” bragged that the offensive had been prepared most effectively and was based on the assurance of victory, that his soldiers would march under the sufficient support of aircraft, guns and tanks to bring honour to the United States of America, and that they would surely win victory.

This was how some combined units of the KPA came to fight a heroic struggle for summer defence operations in the mountainous areas centred on Height 1211 in the eastern sector of the front.

On August 8, 1951, Kim Il Sung sent a letter to commanding officers of the Front Command, in which he ordered not to retreat

even a step and to regain the land the next day without fail if they had had no other alternative than stepping back temporarily.

On August 20, 1951, Kim Il Sung met Choe Hyon, commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps, in his office at the Supreme Headquarters.

Shaking his hand, Kim Il Sung asked how he was and how his soldiers were. He looked happy to learn that all of them were fine.

Now pointing to Height 1211 on the operations map, he said:

Seeking to take Height 1211, the enemy are hurling huge troops into the area as they know they can hardly have their ground units join the units to be landed on the east coast unless they break through the height. We must destroy the main enemy forces on the height and keep it from them. It is difficult to defend the height, but, compared with the days when we were fighting against the Japanese during the anti-Japanese armed struggle, we are in a good situation. We have got army units armed with modern weapons and the stable rear. Our combatants are in high spirits. I am sure the soldiers will keep Height 1211 safe and secure to the end.

Choe Hyon affirmed that he would defend the height at any cost.

The KPA soldiers, emulating the unyielding revolutionary spirit of the fighters of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, repulsed the enemy’s desperate attacks, carrying ammunition and foods by laying cableways of ropes of iron and other materials across valleys

whenever transport routes were cut in flooding. Every bullet, every grenade and every shell counted for them in the battle, and when they ran out of the ammunition, they collected them from the enemy bodies. When even that was impossible, they rolled down rocks and fought hand-to-hand fights.

Tens of thousands of shells flew to the height a day, shattering rocks to powder and burning everything to ashes.

But, this could hardly dampen the spirits of the KPA soldiers.

In an attempt to make a breakthrough in the direction of Height 1211, the enemy troops mounted a dozen attacks a day to heights 556, 983.1 and 1059.4, which were of great tactical importance.

The KPA soldiers formed a circular defence line, and defended the important heights on the line, immediately restoring their positions when they were destroyed in the reckless bombing and bombardment and properly combining firepower and manoeuvring to suit the given situations.

The fiercest battles were fought on Height 983.1 just under the nose of Height 1211.

Setting the south Korean 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division as a bullet shield, the enemy deployed nearly 200 guns 3km away from their attacking positions and showered shells for nine days for gunfire support. That each gun fired 1 860 shells in a fixed position to a section of 15-20m

was boasted by the enemy as "Van Fleets' norm of ammunition," something to be rarely seen in the world history of war.

Nevertheless, the KPA soldiers remained steady on the heights: the KPA 12<sup>th</sup> Andong Infantry Division, defending heights 556 and 983.1, stood unyielding on their line; they repelled, typically on August 18, all the 17 attacks by the south Korean 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and the main force of the US 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division. On Height 983.1 the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 30<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment dealt a serious blow to the enemy by defeating over 20 attacks for three days. In particular, the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon of the 1<sup>st</sup> Company of the battalion fought in a death-defying spirit, even when there were only four of them left alive, keeping the height from the enemy to the end.

As each of the ridges and valleys got covered with the corpses, the enemy were harassed with extreme horror. An American war correspondent on the front described Height 983.1 as a "ridge stained with blood," and some Western commentators said that Van Fleet's attempt to gain confidence by achieving brilliant results in the battle came to a failure.

The KPA 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, occupying the dominant heights like Height 965 and Height 1030.9, conducted powerful firing and countercharges, thus thwarting the enemy's desperate attacks made

under the support of aircraft and guns.

With an insight into the situation on the front, Kim Il Sung advanced the policy of seizing the initiative all along the front by launching an energetic movement of assault parties, aircraft- and tank-hunting teams and sniper teams in combination with positive positional warfare. These original tactics were the developed versions—suited to modern warfare—of those created by him during the anti-Japanese armed struggle. They could not only restrain the enemy’s activities on their defence lines but also destroy their troops and combat equipment far behind the front.



The KPA soldiers defend Height 1211.

Of these, the assaulting tactic, especially night assault, would be powerful as it could turn the defensive actions into active ones so as to keep hold of the initiative on the front and thus defeat the enemy’s technical superiority by tactical superiority.

By drawing on their experience gained in the activity of the storming parties, the KPA units scaled up their activities: formerly, they had conducted them with small parties, but now with large ones; formerly they had limited the raids to individual targets in a certain area, but now different targets at the same time in a wider area.

What was most distinctive of the assaulting actions was the ones conducted by defenders of Height 1211.

On the evening of October 5, 1951, Kim Il Sung called Choe Hyon, commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps that was defending Height 1211. Saying about the need to



conduct intensified reconnaissance of the enemy, he stressed: We are now engaged in positive positional warfare; instead of waiting for the enemy to launch attack, we should dispatch one storming party after another without interruption to destroy their command posts, communication centres, tank assembly points, artillery positions, arsenals and depots.

Earlier, on September 23, 1951, when he climbed Mt Jihye to give instructions to the corps commander, regarding how to defend Height 1211, he said:

To launch intensified positional warfare means in no way excluding assaulting actions. At the same time as launching persistent positional defence warfare, we should conduct bold surprise assaults extensively, if necessary. The KPA units should intensify their storming actions and flail the enemy in different places to annihilate their troops and destroy their installations and combat equipment continuously.

True to his instructions, the units defending Height 1211 briskly conducted surprise assaults. The 2<sup>nd</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> infantry divisions and the engineering battalion and reconnaissance battalion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps organized over 20 storming parties of excellent soldiers, who uninterruptedly raided the enemy command posts, tank assembly points, artillery positions and other targets.



The KPA storming parties engaged in battles

Between October 11 and 15, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division slipped 38 storming parties to the Kachil Peak and Height 1181 area, dealing a heavy blow to the enemy. And between October 17 and 26, 31 parties again went to the area, raiding the enemy soldiers and guns. The 13<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division sent ten such parties to the Johang Valley and Pidulgi Pass areas, surprising the enemy who were going to or taking positions to launch an offensive and thus foiling the enemy's plan of attack.

In late October 1951 the enemy captured a nameless southeastern height between Height 1211 and Kachil Peak, and thus the KPA soldiers were exposed to a greater concentrated fire. Therefore, it was a task of utmost urgency to regain the height from the enemy control. The staff of the corps worked out a plan to wipe out the main force of the enemy on the height through an assault and then send a larger force there to keep hold of it.

At night on November 4, 1951, an 11-member storming party left for the nameless height led by a squad leader. On learning the password from an enemy soldier on kitchen duty on his way to the height, the party climbed the height along a path and captured a sentry, who told that the enemy had just reinforced their forces on the height to launch an attack against Height 1211 when the day broke the next morning. They also learned

from him the positions of the enemy barracks, tents, machine-gun pillboxes and other installations.

After dividing his party into three groups immediately, the squad leader blew off the pillbox first with an anti-tank grenade. With this as the signal, a salvo of powerful shells of the KPA fell on the enemy positions in the back slope of the height.

The storming party threw grenades into the enemy tents one after another. The whole height fell into pandemonium.

Mistaken that the KPA had taken the height, the enemy began to fire shells to it. The members of the storming party, however, were free from damage as they were in ambush behind the height to cut off the retreat of the enemy soldiers. Instead, most of enemy soldiers on the height were killed.

The squad leader fired a signal to the sky over Height 1211, and soon an infantry sub-unit rushed to the height to take it. The battle took less than 20 minutes.

The height was all covered with bodies of the enemy soldiers, and there was a mountain of trophy, such as machine guns and 60mm-calibre mortars.

The preemptive strikes by the storming parties of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps resulted in a huge loss of troops and combat equipment of the enemy, completely foiling their plot to break through the frontline

in the direction of Sohui Pass and Sathae-ri.

The enemy lamented over their plight, saying:

Very often the opponents broke through the frontline to sweep off our long and straight trenches by firing automatic weapons. At the time the difference in the approach to defence between the opponents and the UN forces was like the one between the owner of a hotel and its overnight guest.

The intense activities of the storming parties in both the eastern and western sectors of the front throughout the period of the autumn defence operations consisted in one of the fighting modes that brought about victory in the positional warfare.

The snipers' teams also played an important role in increasing the intensity of defence. Considering the situation, whereby the enemy were based in strong defence positions, the snipers tried hard to kill the enemy soldiers so that they could not move freely individually or in groups.

Order No. 085 of the Supreme Commander of the KPA, titled, *On Organizing Snipers' Teams*, was issued to all People's Army units on November 2, 1951.

The tactic of snipers' team actions made it possible to curb the movements of the enemy soldiers, who were struck with deadly terror.



A sniper of the KPA gets ready for combat action.

As soon as the snipers' team actions began, the ranks of snipers increased rapidly, and their actions got brisk.

It was most obvious along the line of Height 1211.

From the height the enemy positions were in close sight, and when the day broke the enemy soldiers were seen strolling out of their barracks for a fresh air, casting side glances at the KPA positions.

One morning, an enemy officer, wearing nothing but underwear, stood on the breastwork and began to do exercises; he was ridiculously brave. At the moment a bullet pierced through him, shot by a KPA sniper who had been in ambush from the early

morning, enduring the cold.

Seeing him dive into a heap of snow all of a sudden, a group of enemy soldiers gathered around him, when the KPA snipers fired at once, felling some of them mercilessly.

This was a usual method employed by snipers of the KPA, a method of taking several soldiers using one as a bait.

Instead of waiting for the enemy to appear before them, they moved forward to the enemy positions and killed any enemy who came into their sight.

As the snipers' actions got high gear, the enemy found it difficult to engage themselves in daytime actions, and trembled with constant fear of the bullets from the KPA snipers.

The back of the heights, which had been a "shelter" for them, became a deathbed itself.

With the start of the "summer offensive," the US forces, in an attempt to break through the defence positions of the KPA, began to hurl a great number of latest-model tanks into the front.

On August 24, 1951, the Supreme Commander of the KPA issued Order No. 0483 *On Organizing and Training Tank-Hunting Teams*.

These teams infiltrated deep into the enemy rear to destroy the tanks they came across. Despite the strict cordon, they buried anti-

tank mines or lay in ambush before raiding enemy tanks that were on their way to the front. Sometimes they stormed into the tank concentration places.

Earlier, on June 25, 1951, Kim Il Sung issued Order No. 00409 in the name of the Supreme Commander of the KPA *On Further Intensifying the Tank-Destroying Actions*.

The order clarified specific guidelines for tank-destroying teams' actions, including organizing tank-destroying teams with three to ten soldiers and noncommissioned officers in all infantry companies of the KPA, who were loyal to the country and the people and who had been seasoned in battles, giving in all units lessons to members of the tank-destroying teams on how to destroy enemy tanks with individual weapons and find the tanks' weak points, and giving in all ground units lessons to every soldier on how to bury and remove mines.

In accordance with the order, the KPA units organized tank-destroying teams with exemplary combatants and had all battalions and regiments give lessons on how to use individual weapons to destroy enemy tanks and other armoured vehicles.

On the front and in the deep enemy rear the teams destroyed enemy tanks and other armoured vehicles by skilful and subtle tactics—which the enemy could hardly imagine—without being





Members of a tank-hunting team of the KPA lay mines.

affected by any condition.


This kind of fighting experience confirmed the fact that it was important to intensify the sappers' actions in frustrating the desperate moves of the tank and other mechanized units of the enemy.

Based on this experience, Kim Il Sung issued, in the name of the Supreme Commander, Order No. 0483 on conducting more aggressively the campaign of hunting enemy tanks to meet the demands of the active positional warfare.

On the order, sapper sub-units of the combined and other units of the KPA on the frontline organized tank-hunting teams.

The teams penetrated deep into the rear of the enemy, and destroyed enemy tanks and armoured vehicles.

The enemy staff officers were shocked to learn, while studying the damage done to their tanks, that the absolute majority had been destroyed by land mines buried by the KPA engineers, and even distributed manuals which read, "Always remember that 72% of



An enemy tank damaged and aircraft shot down





Aircraft hunters of the KPA

our tanks were lost by the enemy land mines.”

The KPA’s tank-hunting teams destroyed 3 255 tanks of the enemy in the three years of the war.

Meanwhile, the aircraft-hunting teams, formed in late 1950 and armed with machineguns of large calibre, heavy machineguns and anti-tank guns, also played a huge role in frustrating the “air superiority” of the enemy by stepping up their activities on the fourth stage of the war.

Afraid of these teams, the enemy pilots changed their tactics in the second half of 1951—from low-altitude flight to high-altitude flight, from day flight to night flight and from solo flight to group flight.

Through the movements of storming parties, aircraft- and tank-hunting teams and sniper teams in combination with the active positional warfare, the KPA frustrated the enemy’s “summer and autumn offensives” and “Kumhwa offensive.”

Especially in 1952, the KPA units conducted military activities more positively, based on the Juche-based tactics created by Kim Il Sung.

During the operations to frustrate the enemy’s “summer offensive” between August 18 and 23, 1951, they killed or captured some 16 000 enemy troops; they stopped the enemy attack in some

areas of the eastern part of the front by August 24.

And during the adventurous “autumn offensive” the enemy started on September 29, 1951, they firmly held the initiative of the war and crushed the enemy’s attempt in time by killing or capturing 147 700 enemy soldiers, destroying or capturing 279 tanks and armoured vehicles, 113 guns of various calibres and 114 trucks, shooting down or destroying 961 aircraft, sinking or destroying 60 vessels, and destroying or capturing a large number of weapons and other combat equipment.

The height of heroes, Height 1211, and other high and low mountains still soar high, conveying the exploits of the KPA soldiers, who bravely defended the front at the cost of their blood.

## Fighting Against the “Model Battle”

Height T west of Cholwon in the middle part of Korea is not high, but it is widely known.

The victory in the battle on the height, which wrote a brilliant page of the history of the Fatherland Liberation War, is a fruition of the outstanding military wisdom, tactics and devoted efforts of Kim Il Sung.

At the end of January 1953 the US schemed to organize a “model battle.”

Eisenhower became president of the US by availing himself of the plight of the Truman administration, which was driven into a tight corner due to the anti-war movement at home and the repeated defeats in the Korean war, committing himself to putting an end to the tragedy of the Americans in the Korean war. He claimed that a new “offensive” for an “active” expansion of the war was necessary to achieve “honourable peace.”

In order to create a condition for the “new offensive,” the enemy tried to stage local attacks on the front.

The battle to capture Height T was part of the attacks. In fighting the battle, it pursued the aim of demonstrating its “might,” enlisting more troops of its satellite countries in the “new offensive” and bringing pressure to bear upon the DPRK side by having the armistice talks, which had been in recess from October 1952, resumed. In this way, it thought it can force the DPRK side to accept its terms of armistice at the talks.

In addition, by capturing the height that commanded the important roads between Cholwon and Ichon, it intended to take an advantageous starting position for attack and create conditions for subsequent large-scale attacks.

The height was a strategic point that stretched deep into its positions.

If it expanded its success of the “model battle” at the height in parallel with the landing of its forces on the east and west coasts of Korea, it could open a breakthrough for the “new offensive.”

On January 24, 1953, Kim Il Sung, who had seen through the

enemy’s aim of the attack, convened an operations meeting at the office of the KPA Supreme Headquarters.

Pointing to Height T on the operations map, he explained the aim pursued by the enemy, and said:

We have only twelve hours to prepare for the operation as the attack is expected to begin at 05:00 the next day; any good idea is welcome.

The officers grew nervous. At that time one infantry regiment was defending the height, and about a hundred artillery pieces were deployed around it.

The forces were quite inferior to the three divisions the enemy were trying to hurl, and the time left for consolidating the defence capability was so short.

Silence reigned in the room.

An officer of the General Staff rose from his seat, and said that it would be a good idea to reinforce at least two infantry regiments or lure the enemy and strike them from left and right.

Kim Il Sung listened to his opinion, and said:

I think we should reinforce the artillery in this area and combine

the tunnel warfare with gun firepower to frustrate the enemy's attack.

For this, we should manoeuvre some artillery units stealthily and overwhelm the enemy through a combination of tenacious tunnel warfare and powerful artillery engagements when they attack without any thought.

This is the key to frustrating the enemy's purpose of fighting a "model battle."

The participants were instantly filled with confidence and courage.

At that time, over ten tunnels and field positions were well equipped on the height, and the artillery forces on this line could defeat the enemy if a little more artillery power was reinforced.

Kim Il Sung designated the artillery units to be deployed on the height, and confirmed on the map the shortest course of march so that all the artillery units could arrive at the designated place by 04:00 the next day, emphasizing that their rapid deployment would decide the fate of the operation.

He said that political work should be conducted vigorously while making preparations for and making marches so that all the officers and men could arrive at the designated place by the set time without fail.

One of the artillery units Kim Il Sung ordered to advance to the height could arrive at the designated position in nine hours for it was only 88km away; but it was impossible for the other unit to arrive there in time even by running at a fast speed as it was 137km away and there were many hills and ridges on its way, and worse still, it was next to impossible for the unit to manoeuvre under the aerial surveillance of the enemy.

Fully aware of the unfavourable conditions of that unit, Kim Il Sung said:

If the soldiers fully realize the importance of this operation, they will perform their mission; as they have inherited the revolutionary spirit of the anti-Japanese guerrillas, they are strong in the revolutionary spirit and have a high sense of responsibility for their tasks; if they are given the order of the Supreme Headquarters, they will carry it out without fail even at

the cost of their lives.

That night Ri Ul Sol, Kim Il Sung's aide-de-camp, kept contact with the staff officers of the Artillery Command, and reported the Supreme Commander the manoeuvring of the artillery unit once every 30 minutes.

On receiving the report that the artillery units had finished manoeuvring and occupied the fixed places, he said that the units had created a miracle, adding:

All the artillery units should finish their firing preparations as quickly as possible and wait. When the enemy start the attack, the units should open fire to make the enemy's "model battle" a failure.

At 05:00 on January 25, the enemy started the attack on the hill. Before the attack, 80 aircraft strafed the height and hundreds of guns of large calibre bombarded it. Then, the enemy soldiers advanced following 40 tanks.

At that time, the artillery units of the KPA that had manoeuvred secretly opened a salvo.

The enemy's battle formation turned into a pandemonium; the

tanks, guns and armoured vehicles became scraps of iron in an instant. In spite of heavy casualties, the enemy continued attack, believing in their numerical strength.

There was no response from the height until they approached 50m from its top. They continued to advance fiercely, raising a cry, "All the communist soldiers have been burned to death."

Suddenly, a hail of bullets and hand grenades showered on them; the KPA soldiers, who had been taking shelter in tunnels, went out to the trenches, and opened fire.

The "model battle," into which the enemy hurled three divisions and invited even reporters and observers, ended in an ignominious defeat by a combination of the KPA artillery and infantry soldiers, who were relying on tunnels.

Mass media of many countries reported the failed battle under banner headlines.

The enemy were plunged into confusion. The US 8<sup>th</sup> Army commander Van Fleet was dismissed, and there was a heated argument over whether the "new offensive" was feasible.



The victorious battle on Height T shook the US attempt for the “new offensive” to its roots.

## Great Victory in the Armistice Talks

At 15:00 on June 30, 1951, Kim Il Sung called Nam Il, Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, from the front line.

After warmly welcoming him, who arrived at the Supreme Headquarters after receiving the Supreme Commander’s telegraph order, Kim Il Sung said:

You must have had much trouble while coming all the way. I hastily called you to give you an important mission. The US imperialist aggressors proposed armistice talks to us. The Political Committee of the Party Central Committee discussed the issue of armistice talks and decided to dispatch you as the senior delegate of our side.

Nam Il was surprised that the enemy had proposed armistice talks. More surprising was the fact that he was appointed senior delegate to the talks.

Nam Il had been an intellectual, and the Supreme Commander put him forward as senior delegate, regarding him as a man appropriate to implementing the intention of the Supreme Headquarters in military diplomacy with the US imperialists in the grimmest period, as he valued the latter’s sense of national dignity and patriotism and his integrity by which he never compromised with injustice.

Kim Il Sung continued:

Neither ceasefire nor long war matters to us. We do not need to beg the US aggressors for ceasefire. It is the stand of our Party that neither ceasefire nor long war matters to us. You should confidently hold fast to our stand in the talks. You must overwhelm the enemy spiritually from the first day of the talks.

On July 6, 1951 Kim Il Sung called to the Supreme Headquarters the delegates of the KPA to the armistice talks and said:

We have no experience in military armistice talks. But the US imperialists you will have sit face to face have “experiences” in putting forward and realizing their gangster-like demands in many talks with other countries, so you should be prepared to deal with various difficult and complicated problems in the talks. You should be well aware of why the enemy proposed the armistice talks and what their real purposes are.

At 10:00 on July 10, 1951, the Korean armistice talks started in Raebongjang in Kaesong, which had long been called so in the meaning of receiving welcome guests—the start of a serious political confrontation, a battle without gunfire, on the negotiation table with the unwelcome guests, who had invaded Korea.

The DPRK delegation headed by Nam Il and the US delegation headed by Lieutenant General C. Turner Joy, admiral of the Navy under the US Far East Command, sat across the table.

The DPRK delegates took seats on the north side facing the

south, and the US delegates on the south side facing the north.

The moment Joy sat at the table, his face became wrinkled, for the seats had been arranged in line with the Oriental custom by which a victor nation takes seats facing the south and a defeated nation those facing the north.

The US side had come to the venue of the talks on a US army jeep and on three trucks, captured by the KPA. Each vehicle was carrying a white flag in line with the agreement made at the preliminary talks.

Nam Il was the first to speak.

He said:

These talks must deal with the matters concerning ceasing all hostilities by both sides, fixing the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the military demarcation line and withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea at an early date for the cessation of the war and peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

The US side, however, said that “hostilities would continue” during the talks in a display of their “dignity.” And repeating the impudent assertion that the talks should discuss only military issues, it presented the so-called draft agenda that it said had got the final approval of President Truman.

The draft agenda consisting of nine points reflected the US side’s intention to take the initiative in preventing important matters like withdrawal of US troops from being discussed and keeping

pursuing its policy aimed at invading the northern half of Korea while continuously occupying south Korea even after the ceasefire was realized.

With a keen insight into the enemy's scheme, Kim Il Sung phoned Nam Il during a break of the morning talks and instructed him to present a written draft agenda, which consisted of five points: first, agreeing on the talks' agenda; second setting up a Demilitarized Zone with the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the Military Demarcation Line between both sides; third, withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea; fourth, taking measures for ensuring peace and ceasefire in Korea; fifth, dealing with the prisoners of war after ceasefire.

That afternoon, when the DPRK side presented its written draft agenda, the US side was taken aback by the just, clear and reasonable agenda, and obstinately insisted on discussing the repatriation of POWs first. It continued that it could accept other items, but as the items of fixing the Military Demarcation Line and withdrawing foreign forces were political ones, they should be discussed later. And they left hurriedly.

On receiving the report on the result of the first-day talks, Kim Il Sung said that our side should direct the spearhead of attack at the weakest points of the enemy's draft agenda without giving them a way out, and thus make their draft agenda null and void.

At the next day's talks, the senior delegate of the DPRK side

disproved the second and third items of the draft agenda presented by the enemy side.

As its scheme was disclosed during the discussion of the agenda, the US side conducted a "press corps operation" in an attempt to scuttle the talks but in vain. Then it made the talks recessed for three days.

The US delegation, however, had to appear again in the venue of the talks on July 16, and gave up the two items.

On July 17, both sides adopted as agenda items all four points of the draft agenda presented by the DPRK side, except the withdrawal of foreign forces.

It was the fruition of the instructions by Kim Il Sung; he told Nam Il to continue a powerful offensive against the US side when it was retreating during the discussion of the agenda so as to further put the enemy on the defensive. Then he said that our side should not discuss by mixing the items, on which both sides were opposed to each other, but settle the matter of fixing the Military Demarcation Line and supervising ceasefire first, and put aside the matter of withdrawal of foreign forces so that it could be discussed separately.

Then, the DPRK side directed the spearhead of last attack at including in the agenda the item, On Withdrawing All Foreign Forces from Korea.

Nam Il's firm strong voice resounded in the conference hall.

"The Korean war is an outcome of your side's intervention in

the internal affairs of Korea and dispatch of your aggressor troops. Therefore, if the ceasefire is to be assured after its declaration and the Korean question to be settled peacefully, all the foreign forces should be withdrawn from Korea without fail. But why are you dead set against the withdrawal of all foreign forces? A war is not a tour, and soldiers are not tourists. Is the stationing of the US forces aimed at getting them to tour the scenic spots in Korea? The peace-loving people of the world unanimously demand that all the foreign forces be withdrawn from Korea. If your purpose of agreeing to a ceasefire is not to unleash a war again after winning a breathing spell, why do you insist that you will not withdraw from Korea?"

As it failed in its attempt to make the discussion of the item miscarried and found that there was no way out in the face of the uncompromising and principled demand of the DPRK side, the US had its Secretary of State Marshall hold a press conference on July 24, where he explained that it was going to discuss the issue at a highest-level governmental conference after the ceasefire was declared, and on July 26, it agreed on adopting as the fifth item of the agenda the issue of discussing the withdrawal of the foreign forces, presented by the DPRK side, at a governmental political conference to be held after the war.

At the 17-day-long talks for the discussion on the agenda items, the DPRK side won the first round by including on the agenda for the full-dress talks the five items that reflected its demands.

Joy had so dreadful an experience that he later told a reporter that in the first two weeks after the armistice talks started, he had lost 4.5kg in body weight.

In the subsequent talks the US side tried in every way to realize its purpose, but each time it met a strong opposition from the DPRK side.

When the morning talks started on July 27, the senior delegate of the DPRK side began to present his side's proposal on the fixing of the Military Demarcation Line, the second item of the agenda, but the senior delegate of the US side, who was seeing a map showing some mysterious lines without giving a heed to the proposal, presented it, saying something like a "compensation line."

*Compensation line?* The delegates of the DPRK were taken aback.

The map drew the Military Demarcation Line in black, the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone in blue and its northern edge in red, but the northern edge was drawn 80km inside the north's territory. This meant the DPRK side should abandon not only Kaesong, the southern Yonbaek region and part of Ongjin south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel but also the region of Songwoldong, Ongjin County, and Kumchon-Kosong region north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, an area of over 13 000km<sup>2</sup>, or an area tantamount to nearly one-20<sup>th</sup> of the whole territory of the Korean peninsula.

After casting a glance at it, Nam Il, the senior delegate of the

DPRK side, saw through the enemy's insidious attempt to make, with the help of a map and a word of approval, null and void his side's sovereignty over the vast area won at the cost of blood, and burst into laughter, saying he had seen a funny map on which any one could draw lines if he had red, blue and dark pencils.

Feigning surprise and mentioning something like the "superiority" of his side's Air Force and Navy, Joy said as if uttering an incantation without caring whether the other side was listening or not, that the DPRK side should abandon a certain area for "compensation," adding:

The UN forces have the full command of the air and the sea on the Korean peninsula. Which side is to gain interests from the armistice? And which side can blockade the coasts and bomb any points as farthest as the Amnok River? Is it the UN forces or the north Korean army?

The sophistry that the DPRK side should abandon part of its territory as a gift for their air and naval superiority was a brazen-faced logic of the US side, which had been unprecedented in the history of talks during war.

On hearing the report about this, Kim Il Sung called Nam Il over the phone in the afternoon, and said:

The enemy side's proposal on the Military Demarcation Line and its remarks on it are a mad dog's barks. We should deal a powerful strike at their absurd proposal and haughty attitude. First,

we should prove that theirs is a foolish and illogical insistence. We should disprove in a comprehensive way the strange logic on their superiority in the ground, naval and air combat fields. In other words, we should prove that a front on the ground is a concentrated expression of the ground, naval and air forces. In this way, we can expose the invalidity of the enemy's logic that they established a separate "kingdom" in the air and on the sea even though they had come away with a draw in the ground battle. To this end, we can take as examples their retreat as far as to the Taegu line last year and their two rounds of retreat to the south of the Han River, notwithstanding the ruthless bombing and bombarding by their naval and air forces, explaining the impact of the naval and air forces on the ground forces. We should stick to our insistence on fixing the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the Military Demarcation Line.

At the talks held the next day, Nam Il led the talks with the focus put on smashing the US side's absurd logic.

"It is the ground forces that play the decisive role in war, and the air or naval forces can never win a battle on their own. This is well testified by the history of modern warfare. Your attempt to push up the ground front even a little farther, claiming 'compensation' for your air and naval 'superiority,' exposes by itself the unjustifiable nature of your logic. The ground front is secured and developed not merely by the effort of the ground forces but by the combined efforts with the air and naval forces. In your case, the combined



efforts of the ground, air and naval forces manage to maintain the current front even that much.”

Driven to a corner, Joy threatened that his side would occupy the relevant regions on the strength of arms through a combined operation of its air and naval forces.

Nam Il retorted, “Then, let’s make a try. We are afraid of nothing.”

After watching the developments at the talks, Kim Il Sung ordered a more powerful strike so as to demonstrate that his country was not talking idle.

The Korean People’s Army launched active battles.

Now plunged into a quagmire, the US side resorted to every means at the 20<sup>th</sup> session to scuttle the armistice talks. Claiming that it would not take into consideration the DPRK side’s proposal on the fixing of the Military Demarcation Line and had nothing to say about it, its senior delegate kept his mouth shut. It was a perverted provocation.

Struck with astonishment, the senior delegate of the DPRK side answered the other side’s “silence” with silence for more than two hours.

A foreign book explains the then atmosphere in the following way:

Holding a cigar, Joy stared at Nam Il with his neck stretched like a fighting cock.

Nam Il held a pipe between his teeth and stared directly at his opponent, without making an iota of concession. Time flew amid a speechless tension. It was a fierce battle of patience. Nam Il began to smoke with relish one cigarette after another with his pipe.

In this “dumb talk” unprecedented in the world history of diplomacy, Joy failed to bear any longer at last.

In a flagging voice, Joy proposed a recess. He felt he had lost at this “dumb talk” as well.

Several years later Reuters reported that it had been unprecedented to try to get compensation on the ground at the cost of one’s superiority of the naval and air forces.

In mid-September 1951 Nam Il came to the venue of the armistice talks on a luxury car. The car had been used by Muccio, the US ambassador to south Korea, until Seoul fell.

The American delegates, watching it, were dumbstruck with shame, and reporters pressed the shutters of their camera so as not to miss the scoop.

Even after accepting on November 17, 1951 the proposal of the DPRK side on fixing the line of military contact by both sides as the Military Demarcation Line, an item that had been discussed for so long, the US side insisted on including a conditional clause that “both sides reaffirm the understanding that hostile actions will continue until the armistice agreement is signed.” It was aimed at achieving the purpose, which it had failed to do so in the armistice

talks, through military actions.

“There is no provision in our proposal that foresees binding your military action during the negotiation period, from the fixation of the Military Demarcation Line to the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement. Do as you like. However, if you overplay your hand and try to change the already established line by any military pressure, the result will not be as you wish it to be. That is why we reiterate our contention that we do not seek to restrict your subsequent military actions, and that in the event of signing a ceasefire, the bilateral military contact line can be modified according to that change.”

The DPRK side’s resolute answer frightened the US side.

The later course of the war proved that the DPRK side had not said empty words.

The United States could not but kneel down before the Korean people both in the war and in the negotiations. It found that the Korean people were prepared for both of them.

The leadership of Kim Il Sung was the source of all victories of the Korean people.

The US invaders were not aware of this, and miscalculated it.

Later, Joy, the then senior delegate of the UN forces’ side, wrote in his memoirs:

To look back, it was a great mistake for us to have agreed to discuss the armistice line (Military Demarcation Line) before

reaching an agreement on all other issues. The fate of the armistice was determined by the defeat in the debate on the establishment of the armistice line at the time. This was a turning point in the talks.

The United States Department of Military History, an important department of the US Army, admitted it in the following way:

They (the DPRK side–Ed.) were victorious in the fixing of the Military Demarcation Line, which lasted until the end of the war.

On July 27, 1953, the Korean Central News Agency made public to the world the following message from its special correspondent at the signing ceremony of the Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom on July 27.

“A truce has been realized in Korea.

“Today the eyes of the people of good conscience, regardless of what they do and where on the earth, were all focused on Panmunjom in Korea. That is because there is a signing ceremony of the Korean Armistice Agreement here today, which will end the truce talks that have been going on for 24 months and 17 days.

“The peoples of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China and other peace-loving peoples of the world warmly welcome the achievement of the Korean Armistice Agreement, a new step towards peace.

“The three years of the Fatherland Liberation War and the two years of the armistice talks were indeed periods of historic significance of the world. The three years of the war was when the

people of the DPRK overcame hardships and demonstrated their unexcelled bravery and heroism and which was resplendent with glorious victories.”

At 22:00 that day, gunfire stopped at all the outposts of the two sides on the 155-mile line.

The fiercest-ever war had finally come to an end.

The American invaders were defeated.

Thus, the signing ceremony of the Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom, which drew the attention of the world, is etched in



Ceremony of signing the Armistice Agreement

history as a proud event that proclaimed the victory of heroic Korea in the war against the US invaders.

At 21:00 hours that day, 124 guns fired salvos in Pyongyang in celebration of victory in the war.

## Achievements in the Fatherland Liberation War

### 1 567 128 enemy troops killed or captured

405 498 US troops

1 130 965 south Korean puppet army troops

30 665 troops of vassal countries

### Enemy combat equipment

Aircraft: 11 captured, 5 729 shot down and 6 484 damaged

Tanks: 374 captured and 2 690 damaged

Armoured vehicles: 146 captured and 45 damaged

Trucks: 9 239 captured and 4 111 damaged

Naval vessels and other ships: 564 captured, sunk or damaged

Guns of various calibres: 6 321 captured and 1 374 damaged

Small arms of different kinds: 925 152 captured

Communications equipment of different kinds: 5 788 captured

Flame throwers: 117 captured

Shells of different kinds: 489 000 captured

Bullets of different kinds: 21 245 000 captured

Hand grenades of different kinds: 224 000 captured

Mines of different kinds: 14 400 captured

Cranes of different kinds: 5 damaged

## Conclusion



Seventy years have already passed since the gunshots of war stopped in Korea.

The hills where fierce battles took place are now covered with lush bushes, making it hard to find traces of the days, and not many are alive, who can recall their experiences.

The hair of the war veterans, who were in their teens and twenties in the 1950s, has turned grey long before, and the colours of their uniforms have faded. But the spirit of fighting with the belief that they would emerge victorious without fail as long as they were led by Kim Il Sung, a valuable tradition and the spirit of defending the motherland, which they bequeathed, are as meaningful as the victory in the war. These spiritual legacies are still adding vitality to the advance of the Korean people without being discoloured or bleached.



# **The Great Victorious War Tells**

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